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Abstract
This study tested dual-process decision-making models as predictors of between-person
and within-person variation in risk-taking behavior. Additionally, the study integrated trait
perspectives on self-control and impulsivity with decision-making processes to explain risktaking. Participants were 580 college students ages 18 and older (M age = 20.45, range = 18 to
52 years). This study involved three parts. First, participants completed a survey assessing
decision-making processes, self-control, impulsivity and risk-taking behavior. Second, a sub-set
of participants completed laboratory-based measures of self-control and impulsivity. Third,
participants completed a longitudinal online assessment of their risk-taking behavior. Dualprocess models explained concurrent risk-taking, but only the reasoned decision-making process
explained longitudinal risk-taking. The dual decision-making processes appear to operate
through similar pathways, with components from each pathway exhibiting indirect effects
through the other pathway. Impulsivity was linked to higher levels of risk-taking because of
higher levels of behavioral intentions and willingness, whereas self-control was linked to lower
levels of risk-taking because of lower levels of behavioral intentions. Between-person effects
were as common as within-person effects, so future researchers are urged to consider decisionmaking processes averaged across forms of risk-taking and within each form of risk-taking.
Altering decision-making pathways may be an effective way to intervene with individuals at
high risk for engaging in risk-taking behavior.

Keywords: risk-taking behavior; dual decision-making processes; self-control; impulsivity;
between-person; within-person
vi

Decision-making, Impulsivity and Self-control: Between-person and Within-person Predictors of
Risk-taking Behavior
Introduction
Many late adolescents drink alcohol, have unprotected sex and drive over the speed limit
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). While such risk-taking behavior is common
among late adolescents, risk-taking is quite dangerous and many late adolescent deaths can be
attributed to engagement in risk-taking behavior (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012). Individuals who engage in one form of risk-taking are likely to engage in other forms of
risk-taking as well (Osgood, Johnston, O’Malley & Bachman, 1998), but not all adolescents who
engage in one form of risk-taking will engage in another form of risk-taking. The present study
first investigates which adolescents are most likely to engage in substance use, criminal
behavior, risky sex and reckless driving, averaged across forms of risk-taking. Second, the
present study considers why an adolescent may engage in one form of risk-taking but not another
form of risk-taking. In this dissertation, risk-taking behavior in late adolescence will first be
discussed with a focus on four forms of risk-taking relevant to the present investigation.
Decision-making models will then be introduced with an emphasis on dual decision-making
processes. Next, trait models of risk-taking will then be introduced focusing on individual
differences in impulsivity and self-control. Then, decision-making models and trait perspectives
will be integrated in a model that considers both simultaneously. Subsequently, the advantages of
modeling between-person and within-person differences in risk-taking will be described and the
specific approach to assessing between-person and within-person differences used in the current
study will be outlined. Finally, hypotheses will be presented.
Risk-taking Behavior in Late Adolescence
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There are different perspectives regarding what constitutes risk-taking behavior. For
instance, risk-taking has been conceptualized as behavior which, if undertaken, is typically
associated with an increased chance of adverse consequences (Haydon, McRee & Halpern,
2011). From a different perspective, risk-taking is defined as behavior which has uncertain
outcomes (Haydon et al., 2011). The present study focuses on behavior that is undertaken
volitionally and is typically associated with an increased chance of experiencing adverse
consequences rather than behavior that has uncertain outcomes. Although risk-taking behavior is
associated with an increased chance of adverse outcomes, risk-taking is typically seen by
individuals engaging in the risk-taking behavior as being associated with potentially desirable
outcomes such as short-term pleasure (Olson-Madden, Brenner, Corrigan, Emrick, & Britton,
2012). For instance, smoking marijuana may lead to adverse health consequences and trouble
with the law, but individuals may perceive short-term benefits from smoking marijuana.
The present study focuses on four forms of risk-taking behavior: substance use (alcohol,
tobacco, drugs), risky sexual behavior, criminal behavior and reckless driving. These four forms
of risk-taking were selected because many late adolescents’ deaths can be attributed to
engagement in these forms of risk-taking (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012),
but involvement in these forms of risk-taking is quite common (Steinberg, 2007). All four forms
of risk-taking selected for this study are engaged in at high rates during the late teens and early
twenties (Arnett, 2000; Bachman, Johnston , O'Malley & Schulenberg, 1996; Cicchetti &
Rogosch, 2002; Ingersoll & Ewing, 2011; White & Jackson, 2006). Criminal involvement peaks
at ages 18-19 (White, 1992). Likewise, diagnoses of alcohol and drug use disorders (Kessler,
Berglund, Demler, Jin & Walters, 2005) and diagnoses of sexually transmitted diseases (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008) are also elevated during the late teens and early
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twenties. The rate of car accidents is higher among individuals ages 20-24 than among older
adults (United States Census Bureau, 2012). Also, engagement in these forms of risk-taking is
discouraged by society and is not considered socially acceptable. In addition, there is variability
in these four forms of risk-taking in terms of the typicality of engagement in and social
acceptability of these forms of risk-taking. According to the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance
2011 report (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012), 32% of high school students
engage in reckless driving behavior, 23% report currently using marijuana and 40% of sexually
active high school students reported not using a condom during their last sexual intercourse.
While these forms of risk-taking are prevalent among late adolescents, there is variability in how
common engagement in these forms of risk-taking is (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2012). Specifically, risky sexual behavior is most common, followed by reckless
driving. Drug use is least common (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). Analyses
will focus on predicting specific forms of risk-taking and testing whether findings generalize
across the range of risk-taking behavior.
While individuals who engage in one form of risk-taking are more likely to engage in
other forms of risk-taking as well (Burfeind & Bartusch, 2011), the relationship between
different forms of risk-taking is imperfect. For instance, while substance use may be associated
with criminal behavior, not everyone who engages in crime uses substances and not everyone
who uses substances engages in crime. This pattern suggests that some individuals selectively
engage in specific forms of risk-taking while choosing not to engage in other forms of risktaking (Burfeind & Bartusch, 2011). The moderate to high, but imperfect, correlation between
different forms of risk-taking has led some people to focus on risk-taking generally (e.g., Biglan,
Brennan, Foster & Holder, 2004) and some people to focus on specific forms of risk-taking such
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as substance use (e.g., Rawson et al., 1995; Stahler et al., 2005). The present study is an attempt
to develop a flexible model which enables consideration of both the factors that predict risktaking generally and factors that predict involvement in specific forms of risk-taking.
Specifically, the present study examines between-person and within-person differences in risktaking. Between-person analyses will reveal which people are at risk for engaging in risk-taking
behavior and within-person analyses will reveal for which forms of risk-taking each person is at
risk.
In sum, the present study defines risk-taking behavior as behavior that is undertaken
volitionally and is associated with an increased chance of adverse consequences (Haydon et al.,
2011). Specifically, four forms of risk-taking will be investigated: substance use, risky sexual
behavior, criminal behavior and reckless driving. These forms of risk-taking were selected
because they are quite common among late adolescents but they contribute to adolescent
morbidity and mortality (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). In addition, there is
variability in terms of the commonality and social acceptability of these forms of risk-taking
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012). The present study investigates betweenperson and within-person variability in risk-taking behavior.
Risky Decision-Making Models
Individuals’ decision-making regarding risk-taking behavior is best conceptualized from
a dual-process perspective (Albert & Steinberg, 2011; National Research Council, 2011).
According to dual-process models, decision-making involves both a cognitive, reasoned
component as well as a reactive, intuitive and affective process which work together to produce
decisions (Halpern-Felsher, 2011; Reyna & Farley, 2006). The cognitive, reasoned decisionmaking system involves deliberative planning and forethought to engage in or avoid risk-taking
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(Wills, Pokhrel, Morehouse & Fenster, 2011). The reactive pathway is characterized by quick,
intuitive responding (Steinberg, 2007; Wills et al., 2011). In the following sections, the reasoned
and reactive pathways will be more thoroughly reviewed.
Reasoned decision-making. Models focusing on a rational, deliberative approach to
decision-making that have received empirical support include the Health Belief Model, the
Theory of Planned Behavior and the Rational Choice Model. Each of these models incorporates
multiple rational evaluations to explain how people make decisions. This section will review
three reasoned decision-making models.
The first model is the Health Belief Model which is used to explain why people engage in
health promoting behavior (Rosenstock, 1974; Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988) as
compared to risk-taking models that explain why individuals engage in risk-taking or health
destructing behavior. The Health Belief Model’s components are perceived susceptibility to
health threats, perceived severity of health threats, beliefs that certain behavior will benefit
health and perceptions of barriers to engaging in healthy behavior (Rosenstock, 1974;
Rosenstock et al., 1988). The Health Belief Model can apply to substance use, dieting and other
health-related risky behaviors (Rosenstock et al., 1988). While several of the Health Belief
Model’s components are related to health behaviors, the correlations are low and the Health
Belief Model accounts for little variance in health behaviors (Carpenter, 2010; Harrison, Mullen
& Green, 1992). Two meta-analyses of studies testing the Health Belief Model demonstrated that
the Health Belief Model’s components were unrelated to moderately related to behavior
(Carpenter, 2010; Harrison et al., 1992). Carpenter (2010) concluded that using the Health Belief
Model is not recommended.
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The second model is the Theory of Planned Behavior which was developed based on a
previously-existing model, the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen, 1991). Components of the
The Theory of Planned Behavior include one’s attitudes towards the behavior, subjective norms,
perceived behavioral control and behavioral intentions. Attitudes represent an individual’s
beliefs or feelings concerning a behavior. Subjective norms refer to perceptions of social
pressures to perform or not perform the behavior such as an individual’s friends encouraging
them to attend a party where many attendees will be drinking alcohol. Perceived behavioral
control includes self-efficacy, or confidence in one’s ability to perform the behavior, as well as
controllability, or the perception that one has the resources, skills and opportunities to perform
the behavior. Behavioral intentions or plans to perform or not perform the behavior are
conceptualized as the outcome of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control.
As such, behavioral intentions serve as the proximal predictor of individuals’ increased or
decreased likelihood of performing a behavior.
In a meta-analysis of 185 studies, behavioral intentions accounted for 31% of the
variance in self-reported behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Only behavioral intentions is
conceptualized to directly predict risk-taking behavior, but attitudes, subjective norms and
perceived behavioral control together accounted for 39% of the variance in behavioral intentions
and predicted risk-taking behavior indirectly (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Thus, the Theory of
Planned Behavior is evidenced to effectively predict risk-taking behavior (Armitage & Conner,
2001).
The third model is the Rational Choice Framework (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). The
Rational Choice Framework proposes that individuals make decisions based on inducements and
impediments to behavior (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). According to Rational Choice models,
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individuals are expected to engage in criminal behavior when they perceive the benefits of the
behavior to outweigh the costs associated with it (Nagin & Paternsoter, 1993). The principal
component in the Rational Choice Theory is perceived cost or harm of engaging in a behavior,
with individuals who perceive more harm expected to be less likely to perform the behavior than
individuals who perceive less harm. Some versions of the Rational Choice Framework also
incorporate personal moral beliefs regarding whether involvement in a behavior is wrong, with
the assumption that these moral beliefs impede risk-taking behavior (Paternoster & Simpson,
1996). Like the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior, the Rational Choice model
incorporates intentions to commit crime as a predecessor to actual behavior (Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). In tests of Rational Choice Theory, perceived
costs and benefits and personal moral beliefs significantly predicted intentions to engage in risktaking as expected, including corporate crime, drunk driving, theft and sexual assault (Nagin &
Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Thus, the Rational Choice Framework
effectively predicts risk-taking behavior (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; Paternoster & Simpson,
1996).
The Health Belief Model, Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior and
Rational Choice Theory share a common assumption that individuals have a rational decisionmaking process wherein they are able to weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in a risk-taking
behavior. Each of the theories incorporates rational processes though processes differ across
models. For instance, the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior and Rational Choice
Theory include behavioral intentions in their models. The variable subjective norms is unique to
the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior while personal moral beliefs is unique to
Rational Choice Theory.
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The models also have different predictive utility. The Health Belief Model and its
components are weakly related to behavior and researchers do not recommend utilizing the
model (e.g., Carpenter, 2010). The Theory of Planned Behavior and the Rational Choice model
both account for more variance in risk-taking than the Health Belief Model but limited empirical
research was found testing the Rational Choice model. Because the most empirical support
seems available for the Theory of Planned Behavior, the Theory of Planned Behavior serves as
the primary framework for the reasoned decision-making pathway in the present study’s
conceptualization of decision-making processes. As such, the present study’s conceptualization
of the reasoned decision-making process will include behavioral intentions, attitudes, subjective
norms and perceived behavioral control.
Reactive decision-making. In addition to the reasoned pathway, dual-process models
recognize a second, parallel pathway – the less planned, intuitive, affective and reactive pathway
– which does not rest on elaborate cognitive processing but works in tandem with the reasoned
pathway to produce decisions (Albert & Steinberg, 2011). In general, the reactive decisionmaking pathway has received less theoretical and empirical attention than the reasoned decisionmaking pathway. The two most studied models of the reactive pathway are the Fuzzy-Trace
Theory (Reyna & Farley, 2006) and the Prototype Willingness Model (Gerrard, Gibbons,
Houlihan, Stock, &Pomery, 2008). This section will review both of these models and the
evidence of their effectiveness.
According to Fuzzy-Trace Theory, the intuitive decision making process is guided by gist
representations, which capture the overall meaning of a situation (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).
Whereas the reasoned decision-making pathway is conceptualized as being guided by precise
thought processes, gist representations are vague and based on intuition (Reyna & Brainerd,
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2011). The gist of a situation is the subjective interpretation based on emotion, education, culture
and experience (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011). Fuzzy-Trace Theory differs from other dual-process
models by emphasizing gist-based processing as a more advanced form of decision-making than
reasoned decision-making because there are increases in gist-processing with age (Reyna &
Brainerd, 2011; Reyna & Rivers, 2008). Also in contrast to other dual-process models which
conceptualize either the reasoned or reactive pathways as capable of leading to increased or
decreased levels of risk-taking, Fuzzy-Trace Theory posits that reasoned decision-making may
lead individuals to engage in more risk-taking behavior whereas gist-based decision-making may
be more risk averse (Rivers, Reyna & Mills, 2008).
Experiments with children, adolescents and adults have observed increased reliance on
gist-based processing with age, consistent with fuzzy trace theory (Reyna & Farley, 2006;
Reyna, Lloyd & Brainerd, 2003). For instance, when presented with a choice to win some money
($2,000) and a risky option (to win $2000 or nothing depending on the outcome of a coin flip)
adults do not focus on the magnitude of money to be won but instead view the options as
representing that they may win some money for sure versus possibly win some money or win
nothing depending on the coin flip (Rivers et al., 2008). In contrast, children focus on the
magnitude of money to be won, in support of fuzzy trace theory’s hypothesis that with
development comes increased reliance on gist-based processing rather than reasoned processing
which is evident at earlier developmental stages (i.e., the details; Reyna & Farley, 2006). In
support of fuzzy trace theory’s hypothesis that gist-based processing is more risk averse than
reasoned decision-making, children, who use more reasoned processing, prefer to choose the
option with the potential of winning a larger sum of money but with the potential to win nothing
whereas adults, who use more gist-based processing, prefer the sure, smaller sum of money
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option (Rivers et al., 2008). Although fuzzy trace theory works well in artificial, lab-based
decision-making studies, its predictions are mostly developmental and cognitive and it has not
been used to predict real-world risk-taking. Fuzzy trace theory proponents use Prototype
Willingness Model as evidence of the predictive utility of gist processing for real world risktaking behavior (Gibbons, Gerrard & Lane, 2003; Rivers et al., 2008).
According to the prototype willingness model (Gerrard et al., 2008), the reactive,
intuitive decision-making process is guided by a unique component that is not included in the
reasoned pathway – individuals’ prototypes or schematic images of typical risk-takers their age.
For example, within the prototype willingness perspective, individuals who hold more favorable
views of smokers are expected to be more likely to smoke than individuals who hold less
favorable views of smokers (Gerrard et al., 2008). The outcome of the reactive, intuitive
decision-making process is that social prototypes are expected to predict willingness to engage in
a risky behavior if presented with an opportunity (e.g., Pomery, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan &
Gerrard, 2009). To be clear, willingness indicates that individuals may not plan on performing
the behavior (i.e., experience behavioral intentions) but given a context which affords them the
opportunity to perform the behavior – such as presence at an unsupervised party where alcohol
and drugs are available – they would be willing to engage in the behavior (Gerrard et al., 2008).
Prototype perceptions are evidenced to predict willingness to engage in substance use
(Andrews, Hampson, Barclay, Gerrard & Gibbons, 2008), unprotected sex (Thornton, Gibbons
& Gerrard, 2002) and reckless driving (Gibbons, Lane, Gerrard, Pomery & Lautrup, 2002).
Willingness, in turn, predicts individuals’ engagement in many forms of risk-taking such as
smoking, drinking, substance use, unprotected sex and reckless driving (Gerrard et al., 2008).
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The fuzzy trace theory’s predictions are mostly developmental and cognitive and it has
not been used to predict real world risk-taking behavior. In contrast, the prototype-willingness
model is evidenced to significantly predict real world risk-taking (e.g., Gerrard et al., 2008).
Because of the evidence linking the Prototype Willingness Model with risk-taking behavior, the
Prototype Willingness Model serves as the primary framework for the reactive decision-making
process in the present study’s conceptualization of decision-making. As such, the present study’s
conceptualization of the reactive decision-making process includes prototype perceptions and
willingness to engage in risk-taking.
Concluding, dual process decision-making models posit that individuals choose to engage
in risk-taking behavior via two decision-making processes – a reasoned process and a reactive
process. Reasoned decision-making models demonstrated to effectively predict risk-taking
behavior include the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Rational Choice model, although most
evidence is available for the Theory of Planned Behavior. As such, the Theory of Planned
Behavior will serve as the primary framework for the reasoned decision-making process in the
current study. For the reactive pathway, the prototype willingness model has the most empirical
support for predicting real world risk-taking behavior and it will serve as the primary framework
for the reactive pathway in the current study.
Trait Models of Risk-Taking
Trait models conceptualize risk-taking as a product of stable, situation-invariant
individual differences. Risk-takers are distinguished from non-risk-takers on the basis of
between-person differences in propensity for risk-taking such as impulsivity and low selfcontrol. This section begins by reviewing the evidence for impulsivity and self-control as being
distinct but interrelated processes that work in tandem. Next, an overview of the
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conceptualization of impulsivity and self-control in psychological literature is provided.
Subsequently, the present study’s conceptualization and measurement of impulsivity and selfcontrol is outlined. This section concludes with a summary of the measurement of impulsivity
and self-control in the psychological literature and a description of how impulsivity and selfcontrol will be measured in the present study.
Impulsivity and self-control as distinct but inter-related. Impulsivity and self-control
are believed to stem from different neurological bases (Lieberman, 2007; Steinberg, 2008). The
neural structures involved in impulsivity are activated under conditions that promote automatic,
implicit or non-conscious processing of information (Lieberman, 2007). The neural structures
involved in impulsivity also tend to be the phylogenetically older subcortical regions
(Lieberman, 2007). As such, the structures involved in impulsivity are the amygdala, basal
ganglia, lateral temporal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (Lieberman, 2007). In contrast, self-control is reflected in higher cognitive processes that
are experienced as intentional and effortful including implementation of goals and plans and
inhibition (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). The structures involved in self-control are the anterior
cingulate cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex and the hippocampus and
surrounding medial temporal lobe region (Lieberman, 2007).
The neural split between impulsive and self-controlled processes is in line with the neural
distinction between the reasoned and reactive decision-making processes. That is, there is
evidence for a neural division between the reasoned and reactive decision-making processes that
lines up with the neural separation between impulsivity and self-control. The reactive system
corresponds to subcortical structures including the amygdala, and basal ganglia – similar to
impulsivity – while the reasoned system corresponds to frontal cortical structures such as the
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lateral prefrontal cortex, similar to self-control (e.g., Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Thus, both
impulsivity and self-control are likely involved in the decision-making processes leading to risktaking behavior and it may be important to consider both impulsivity and self-control
simultaneously when studying the etiology of risk-taking (Chen & Vazsonyi, 2011).
While the brain structures involved in impulsivity and self-control are discriminable, they
are also inter-related. The prefrontal cortex involved in self-control is linked via the
orbitalmedial prefrontal circuit with the subcortical structures involved in impulsivity (Salloway
& Cummings, 1994). The orbitalmedial prefrontal circuit between the structures involved in selfcontrol and the impulsive brain structures modulates impulses (Salloway & Cummings, 1994)
and corrects and regulates emotional and behavioral responses by exerting control over limbic
pathways involved in impulsivity via extensive reciprocal connections with the amygdala and
other limbic structures (Herpertz et al., 2001). Thus, limbic-orbiotofrontal circuit dysfunction is
thought to be involved in impulsivity for some individuals via under activation of prefrontal
areas involved in inhibiting behavior, overstimulation of the limbic regions involved in drive, or
both (Van Reekum, 1993).
Impulsivity and self-control operate simultaneously and interact to influence behavior
(Bickel, Miller, Kowal, Lindquist & Pitcock, 2007; Chen & Vazsonyi, 2011; Romer, Duckworth,
Sznitman & Park, 2010; Steinberg, 2007; Wills et al., 2011). Impulsivity has been demonstrated
to be less strongly related to substance use and other problem behavior when individuals reported
higher rather than lower levels of self-control (Chen & Vazsonyi, 2011; Wills et al., 2011). The
trait-level perspective assumes that risk-taking behavior occurs in the absence of self-control
(e.g., Bickel et al., 2007). Assuming that individuals with high levels of self-control will always
choose to not engage in risk-taking behavior, risk-taking behavior results when the influence of
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self-control is undermined by impulsivity (Bickel et al., 2007). Engagement or non-engagement
in risk-taking behavior may result from different combinations of impulsivity and self-control. If
an individual experiences impulsivity, self-control would be required in order for that person to
not engage in risk-taking behavior. As such, an individual who experiences impulsivity
combined with low levels of self-control, or low abilities to resist their impulsive drives, would
be expected to engage in risk-taking. However, an individual who experiences impulsivity as
well as self-control would not be expected to engage in risk-taking behavior because their ability
to control themself can override or alter their impulsive tendencies. If an individual does not
experience impulsivity, self-control may not be required to resist engaging in risk-taking
behavior. Individuals who are low on both impulsivity and self-control are not expected to
engage in risk-taking. Instead, individuals low in both impulsivity and self-control are evidenced
to experience internalizing problems rather than externalizing problems (Eisenberg et al., 2001).
Concluding, impulsivity and self-control work in tandem and it is necessary to assess both
constructs to better understand why risk-taking behavior occurs.
The pattern of increased risk-taking, reduced self-control and heightened impulsivity
during adolescence relative to both childhood and adulthood has been explained as a
consequence of neural maturation (e.g., Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005; Ernst, Pine
& Hardin, 2006; Casey, Getz & Galvan, 2008; Steinberg, 2008). According to the triadic model,
reduced self-control, heightened impulsivity and elevated risk-taking associated with
adolescence are attributable to an imbalance in the functional maturity between the striatum and
amygdala and in their regulation by the prefrontal cortex during adolescence (Ernst et al., 2006).
More primitive areas necessary for basic motor/sensory processes including the striatum mature
earlier than regions associated with cognition such as the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Giedd, 2004).

14

Reduced self-control and heightened impulsivity during adolescence are attributable to a
strong reward system (nucleus accumbens), a decreased harm-avoidance system (amygdala) and
“poor brakes” (prefrontal cortex; Ernst et al., 2006). In functional imaging studies, adolescents’
have mature adult-like responses of the nucleus accumbens but less mature (more child-like)
responses of the orbital frontal cortex to rewarding stimuli (Galvan et al., 2006; Durston et al.,
2006). The orbital frontal cortex is involved in appraisal of outcome (Knutson, Adams, Fong, &
Hommer, 2001) so this immature response predisposes adolescents to value more immediate
short-term over long-term gains (Ernst et al., 2006).
The amygdala, involved in processing emotions, is mature early in life as indicated by
mature (adult-like) responses of the amygdala to affective stimuli such as emotional faces in
childhood (Baxter & Murray, 2002). However, connections from the amygdala to the cortex –
which helps inhibit inappropriate or dangerous behavior – develop gradually from adolescence to
adulthood rendering adolescents less capable of inhibiting behavior (Cunningham,
Bhattacharyya, & Benes, 2002). The connections between the amygdala and cortex that emerge
very late in adolescence or early in adulthood may foster the emergence of the behavioral brake
of the prefrontal cortex, and may be associated with the improvement in self-control and
reduction of impulsivity seen over time (Halperin & Schulz, 2006).
Conceptualization of impulsivity and self-control in psychological literature. The
inter-relatedness of impulsivity and self-control leads to conceptual ambiguity in the literature,
particularly the literature that relies on self-report measures of impulsivity and self-control.
Individuals’ behavior may be influenced both by their impulsive drives towards the behavior as
well as by their self-control mechanisms that attempt to inhibit the behavior (Schmeichel,
Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2010). Because impulsivity and self-control are related it is
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difficult to disentangle the effects of impulsivity versus self-control in contributing to real-world
behavior. Generally, both impulsivity and low self-control are related to increased levels of risktaking behavior such as aggression, substance use, criminal behavior, reckless driving and risky
sexual behavior (Feil, Sheppard, Fitzgerald, Yücel, Lubman & Bradshaw, 2010; Griffin, Scheier,
Acevedo, Grenard & Botvin, 2012; Jones & Quisenberry, 2004; Stanford, Greve, Boudreax,
Mathias & Brumbelow, 1996). Impulsivity may be associated with risk-taking because impulsive
individuals are enticed by immediate, short-term gratification (Hofmann, Friese & Strack, 2009)
and risky behavior often provides short-term gratification (Olsen-Madden et al., 2012). Low selfcontrol may be related to risk-taking behavior because individuals with low self-control have
difficulty suppressing actions which are inappropriate (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), in accord
with the proposition that impulsivity and self-control work together to influence behavior.
Models of impulsivity and self-control in the psychological literature often blend the two
constructs and include additional components. Models of impulsivity and self-control are
generally quite broad and cover many processes thought to lead to or be involved in impulsivity
and self-control (e.g., Dick et al., 2010; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Whiteside & Lynam,
2001). For instance, recent models of impulsivity include five processes thought to lead to
impulsivity: positive and negative urgency or acting rashly when experiencing extreme positive
or negative moods, respectively; lack of premeditation or a tendency to act without deliberation;
lack of perseverance or an inability to complete dull tasks or filter out distractions and sensationseeking or the tendency to seek out novel or exciting stimulation (Dick et al., 2010; Whiteside &
Lynam, 2001). Some definitions of self-control include impulsivity (Gottfredson & Hirschi,
1990). According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), low self-control is characterized by risk
seeking, preference for physical activities, non-verbal communication, shortsightedness, volatile

16

temper and impulsivity. In sum, current models of impulsivity, which include five different
processes thought to underlie impulsivity, are quite broad and tap more constructs than just
impulsivity. Further, some conceptualizations blend impulsivity and self-control. Here,
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) purported that impulsivity is a characteristic of low self-control
individuals. The present study utilizes a more narrow definition of impulsivity and self-control
than the broad conceptualizations often employed in the psychological literature in order to
distinguish impulsive and self-controlled processes.
The present study’s conceptualization of impulsivity and self-control. The present
study conceptualizes impulsivity and self-control as distinct processes which work together. In
the present study, impulsivity is considered an indicator of an inclination to approach or perform
a certain behavior (Hofmann et al., 2009; Rothbart, Ahadi & Hershey, 1994). Impulsivity is
directed towards stimuli with incentive values that enable immediate, short-term gratification and
the incentive value of the tempting stimulus diminishes as temporal or spatial distance increases
(Ainslie, 1975; Hofmann et al., 2009). In other words, individuals who are highly impulsive tend
to act spontaneously and without deliberation and they have a heightened responsiveness to
rewards and immediate behavioral cues (Carver, 2005).
Self-control is conceptualized in the present study as referring to a person’s ability to
override, inhibit and regulate socially unacceptable and undesirable impulses (e.g., Tangney,
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Self-control includes delay of gratification which is the capacity to
decline immediate, less preferred outcomes to attain more preferred outcomes in the future
(Finkenauer, Engels, & Baumeister, 2005). Individuals high in self-control tend to be reflective
and deliberative in their actions, can continue behavior in the absence of reward and exhibit high
levels of forethought and planning (Carver, 2005).
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Measurement of impulsivity and self-control in psychological literature and in the
current study. Impulsivity and self-control have been measured via response inhibition and
other executive function tasks, delay of gratification tasks and self- and other-informant report
questionnaires (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Laboratory tasks measuring impulsivity and selfcontrol are typically better able to distinguish the two constructs than self-report measures. Selfreport measures often blend the constructs or tap additional constructs rather than just
impulsivity and self-control. Because laboratory measures seem better able to differentiate
impulsivity and self-control than self-report measures, in the current study, two laboratory tasks
will be used to index impulsivity and self-control. However, many researchers use self-report
measures of impulsivity and self-control. To assess whether findings are generalizable using selfreport measures, the present study will also include two self-report measures of impulsivity and
self-control. Thus, in the current study, two laboratory tasks and two self-report measures will be
used to assess impulsivity and self-control.
A delay discounting paradigm (Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & De Wit, 1999) will be used
to index impulsivity in the present study. Delay discounting tasks are based on the principle that
as a reward is delayed, the reward value is reduced and impulsive individuals prefer smaller,
immediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards (Ainslie, 1975; Kirby, Petry & Bickel, 1999).
Adverse consequences are considered in the same framework as rewards, with larger, delayed
consequences often preferred over smaller, immediate consequences (Ainslie, 1975; Kirby, Petry
& Bickel, 1999). Considering both desirable and aversive outcomes, impulsive individuals will
likely choose small, immediate rewards with large, delayed adverse consequences over large,
delayed rewards with small, immediate adverse consequences (Kirby et al., 1999). Indeed, the
limbic brain system reflective of impulsivity is preferentially activated by decisions involving
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immediately available rewards (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein & Cohen, 2004). As such,
greater influence of the impulsive system should be evidenced by participants’ preference for
immediate rewards (McClure et al., 2004). In accord with impulsive individuals’ preference for
immediate rewards on delay discounting tasks, impulsive individuals often align themselves with
the likelihood of experiencing large long-term costs in exchange for modest short-term gains
(Bornovalova, Daughters, Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005; Kirby et al., 1999).
The stop-signal reaction-time task is a paradigm used to measure response inhibition or
self-control and will be used to index self-control in the present study (e.g., Duckworth & Kern,
2011; Logan, 1994; Wood & Neal, 2007). In the stop-signal paradigm, participants perform a go
task such as pressing a button for a certain symbol (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). On some trials,
the go stimulus is followed by a stop signal, which instructs participants to withhold a response
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Stopping a response requires a control mechanism that prevents
the execution of the motor response and thus indexes response inhibition or self-control (Logan,
1994). The time between the presentations of the go stimulus and the stop-signal varies,
providing a sensitive estimate of the time taken for individuals to inhibit responses (Chamberlain
& Sahakian, 2007).
Evidence implicates the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia in stop signal response
control and the interaction between the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia is especially
involved in successful response inhibition in the stop-signal reaction-time task (e.g., Band & van
Boxtel, 1999). Individuals with lesions of the right frontal lobe exhibit much slower response
inhibition on the stop-signal reaction-time task than controls (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore,
Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003). In particular, inferior frontal gyrus damage was evidenced to be
especially disrupting to stop-signal response inhibition because damage to the inferior frontal
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gyrus was highly correlated with slower stop-signal reaction-time speeds whereas damage to
adjacent regions was not or not as highly correlated with stop-signal reaction-time speed (Aron et
al., 2003). The basal ganglia also plays a role in inhibiting responses on the stop-signal reactiontime task because individuals with lesions to the basal ganglia show slower response inhibition
on the stop-signal reaction-time task than controls (Rieger, Gauggel & Burmeister, 2003).
Furthermore, frontostriatal circuits that connect the frontal lobe with the basal ganglia are
involved in response inhibition (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Rieger et al., 2003). To
implicate frontostriatal involvement, a lesion to any area of the frontostriatal circuit should lead
to the same deficits in performance and thus the deficits of individuals with frontal and basal
ganglia lesions should be comparable (Chambers et al., 2009; Rieger et al., 2003). Indeed,
individuals with frontal and basal ganglia lesions do show comparable deficits in response
inhibition on the stop-signal reaction-time task, in support of the role of frontostriatal circuitry in
response inhibition (Rieger et al., 2003). Thus, the prefrontal cortex which is implicated in selfcontrol is activated by response inhibition on the stop-signal reaction-time task. Also, subcortical
regions including the basal ganglia that are involved in impulsive processes are activated by stop
signal responses. In addition, the frontalstriatal circuitry that connects the brain regions
implicated in impulsivity and self-control are activated by response inhibition on the stop-signal
reaction-time task. Because response inhibition on the stop-signal reaction-time task activates
areas of the brain implicated in self-control as well as the circuitry that connects the brain regions
involved in self-control and impulsivity, the stop-signal reaction-time task seems to be a good
measure of self-control for the present study’s purpose.
Integrating Trait and Decision Making Models
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Trait models emphasize time-stable individual differences between people in propensity
to engage in risk-taking whereas decision-making models emphasize processes that may vary
both across people and within people across behavior. In other words, trait models posit that
behavior is due to general traits such as impulsivity and self-control that vary only between
people. For instance, a highly impulsive individual is conceptualized as being more likely than a
person low in impulsivity to engage in many forms of risk-taking (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirschi,
1990). In contrast, according to dual-process models, behavior is the joint outcome of two
different processes within each individual – reasoned and reactive processes (e.g., Wiers, Ames,
Hofmann, Krank & Stacy, 2010). Between-person, trait models are not able to explain withinperson variability. Within-person models explain why individuals engage in one risk-taking
behavior but not another risk-taking behavior. The limitation of trait models is that an individual
may experience high levels of trait impulsivity but still not experience favorable feelings towards
certain forms of risk-taking that are not of interest to the individual (Friese & Hofmann, 2009;
Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008). In other words, not every impulsive individual engages in all
types of risk-taking behavior. Integrating decision-making processes and individual trait
differences into the same model can account for both within-person and between-person
variation.
It is also possible that broad trait-level factors moderate how the more specific decisionmaking processes function. In prior research, self-control interacted with decision-making
processes to influence risk-taking behavior. Only self-control was assessed and no studies tested
how impulsivity aligns with decision-making pathways. For instance, in Thush et al.’s (2008)
study, implicit arousal to alcohol, similar to prototype perceptions in the reactive decisionmaking process, predicted alcohol use and problems among individuals with low self-control (as
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indexed by low working memory capacity) but not among individuals with high self-control or
high working memory capacity (Thush et al., 2008). Two other studies that indexed self-control
by working memory capacity (Grenard et al., 2008) and response inhibition on the Stroop task
(Houben & Wiers, 2009) confirmed Thush et al.’s (2008) finding that implicit associations
indicative of the reactive decision-making process, and similar to the Prototype Willingness
Model’s image of risk takers, predicted substance use among individuals with low levels of selfcontrol but not or not as strongly among individuals with high levels of self-control. Only one
study tested the alignment of self-control with both the reactive and reasoned decision-making
processes. Explicit arousal to alcohol, similar to deliberative, thought-out attitudes or weighing
of pros and cons in the reasoned decision-making process, predicted alcohol use and problems
among individuals with high self-control but not among individuals with low self-control (Thush
et al., 2008). In sum, prior research has yielded significant interactions between self-control and
decision-making processes in predicting risk-taking behavior. Accordingly, an interaction
between self-control and reasoned decision-making processes is hypothesized in the present
study.
Between-person and Within-person Levels of Analyses
Much research has focused on between-person differences in risk-taking and there has
been relatively less research investigating within-person differences in risk-taking. While
between-person analyses can account for why individuals who are at risk for engaging in one
form of risk-taking are at risk for engaging in other forms of risk-taking as well, within person
analyses can account for why the same person is at risk for engaging in certain forms of risktaking but not others (Fleeson, 2004). Between-person analyses identify individuals who are
more likely to engage in risk-taking than other individuals. For example, between people, more
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willingness to engage in general risk-taking, aggregated across forms of risk-taking, is expected
to predict which individuals are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior than others.
Within-person analyses reveal which forms of risk-taking each person is most likely to engage
in. Within people, more willingness to use drugs than engage in risky sex is expected to predict
greater frequency of drug use than sexual behavior because of behavioral specificity. According
to the specificity matching principle, researchers using global attitudes towards risk-taking as a
predictor should focus on global outcome measures, such as several outcomes bundled together
or general risk-taking (Swann, Chang-Schneider, & McClarty, 2007). Similarly, researchers
interested in predicting specific outcomes such as drug use should use a specific predictor such
as attitudes towards drug use (Swann et al., 2007). In the present study, to account for who is at
risk as well as for which forms of risk-taking each person is at risk, a mixed effects model is
utilized to test both between-person and within-person variation in risk-taking.
In the present study, impulsivity and self-control serve as trait-level, between-person
predictors of risk-taking. That is, impulsivity and self-control are only assessed at the betweenperson, aggregate level and are not assumed to vary across specific forms of risk-taking.
Decision-making constructs are assessed at both the between-person and within-person levels.
As between-person predictors, decision-making variables represent an aggregation of values that
differ across forms of risk-taking. Mean levels (aggregated across all four forms of risk-taking
behavior) of willingness is an example of this type of between-person predictor. Individuals
more willing to engage in risk-taking behavior are hypothesized to engage in more risk-taking
behavior than individuals less willing to engage in risk-taking behavior. As within-person
predictors, decision-making variables are able to assume different values for each form of risktaking. Willingness to engage in specific forms of risk-taking relative to other forms of risk-
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taking is an example of a within-person predictor. Here, an individual who is more willing to
drive recklessly than to use drugs would be hypothesized at greater risk for driving recklessly
than using drugs.
Hypotheses
Hypotheses will be tested at both the between-person and within-person levels. Betweenperson hypotheses aim to predict why some individuals engage in more risk-taking behavior than
others and focus on associations among variables averaged across all four forms of risk-taking
(see Figure 1). Within-person hypotheses aim to explain why each individual is more likely to
engage in some forms of risk-taking than others and focus on form-specific associations among
variables (see Figure 2). Hypotheses one through six will have between-person and withinperson variations. Hypotheses seven through 11 are only between-person hypotheses because
impulsivity and self-control are only measured at the between-person level.
Reasoned decision-making model.
Hypothesis 1:
Between-person: Participants reporting higher behavioral intentions will engage in more
frequent risk-taking behavior relative to other participants.
Within-person: Participants will engage more frequently in those forms of risk-taking for
which they report higher behavioral intentions relative to other forms of risk-taking.
Hypothesis 2:
Between-person: Participants reporting higher favorable attitudes will report higher
behavioral intentions relative to other participants. Behavioral intentions will account for the link
between attitudes and risk-taking behavior.
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Within-person: Participants will report higher behavioral intentions for those forms of
risk-taking for which they report higher favorable attitudes relative to other forms of risk-taking.
Behavioral intentions will account for the link between attitudes and risk-taking behavior.
Hypothesis 3:
Between-person: Participants reporting higher subjective norms will report higher
behavioral intentions relative to other participants. Behavioral intentions will account for the link
between subjective norms and risk-taking behavior.
Within-person: Participants will report higher behavioral intentions for those forms of
risk-taking for which they report higher subjective norms relative to other forms of risk-taking.
Behavioral intentions will account for the link between subjective norms and risk-taking
behavior.
Hypothesis 4:
Between-person: Participants reporting higher perceived behavioral control will report
higher behavioral intentions relative to other participants. Behavioral intentions will account for
the link between perceived behavioral control and risk-taking behavior.
Within-person: Participants will report higher behavioral intentions for those forms of
risk-taking for which they report higher perceived behavioral control relative to other forms of
risk-taking. Behavioral intentions will account for the link between perceived behavioral control
and risk-taking behavior.
Reactive decision-making model.
Hypothesis 5:
Between-person: Participants reporting higher willingness will engage in more frequent
risk-taking behavior relative to other participants.
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Within-person: Participants will engage more frequently in those forms of risk-taking for
which they report higher willingness relative to other forms of risk-taking.
Hypothesis 6:
Between-person: Participants reporting higher favorable prototype perceptions will report
higher willingness relative to other participants. Willingness will account for the link between
prototype perceptions and risk-taking behavior.
Within-person: Participants will report higher willingness for those forms of risk-taking
for which they report higher favorable prototype perceptions relative to other forms of risktaking. Willingness will account for the link between prototype perceptions and risk-taking
behavior.
Moderation of impulsivity by self-control.
Hypothesis 7: The association between impulsivity and risk-taking behavior will be
weaker at higher than lower levels of self-control.
Impulsivity and decision-making.
Hypothesis 8: The association between willingness and risk-taking behavior will be
stronger at higher than lower levels of impulsivity.
Hypothesis 9: There will be a significant indirect path from impulsivity to risk-taking
behavior through willingness.
Self-control and decision-making.
Hypothesis 10: The association between behavioral intentions and risk-taking behavior
will be stronger at higher than lower levels of self-control.
Hypothesis 11: There will be a significant indirect path from self-control to risk-taking
behavior through behavioral intentions.
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Method
Participants
College students were selected to participate in the present study because involvement in
various forms of risk-taking such as binge drinking, impaired driving and substance use is very
prevalent among college students (e.g., Slutske, 2005). Five-hundred eighty college students
ages 18 and older were recruited for this study. Thirty nine percent of adolescents (N = 222)
were 18 years old when the study began (M age = 20.45, range = 18 to 52 years). Females
comprised 62.6% of the sample. Fifty-three percent of the adolescents were European-American,
17.6% were African American, 8.6% were multiracial, 8.1% were Hispanic/Latino, 7.8% were
Asian, and 2.6% were other races. Mothers’ education levels varied (i.e., 31.2% completed some
college or trade or technical school, 27.8% completed high school, 20.5% earned a college
degree, 12.1% earned a graduate degree and 6.7% did not complete high school).
Three types of data were collected from participants. An anticipated sample size of 250
was determined to be adequate to address the objectives of the proposed research based on
estimating 25 parameters in between-person models. Recruitment yielded a significantly larger
sample than anticipated (i.e., n = 580), and all participants completed the wave 1 questionnaire.
However, it was not feasible to schedule all 580 participants to complete the wave 2 lab tasks in
the time available (i.e., one semester) to compensate participants for their participation. As such,
only 57.4% (n = 333) of the sample completed the lab tasks. Furthermore, although all
participants were asked to complete the wave 3 longitudinal online survey, only 67.9% (n = 394)
of the sample provided longitudinal data. The types of data collected from participants produced
multiple participation patterns. Two primary comparisons were made. Participants who
completed versus did not complete the laboratory tasks were compared with one another and
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participants who completed versus did not complete the longitudinal online survey were
compared with one another to determine whether participants from these groups differed on any
variables of interest.
Table 1 compares participation groups on study variables. Participants who did not
complete the laboratory tasks reported higher levels of risk-taking at wave 3 than participants
who completed the laboratory tasks. Similarly, participants who did not complete the laboratory
tasks reported higher levels of behavioral intentions, willingness, more favorable subjective
norms and more perceived behavioral control compared to participants who completed the
laboratory tasks. However, participants who did not complete the laboratory tasks reported less
favorable attitudes towards risk-taking than participants who completed the laboratory tasks.
Participants who did not complete the laboratory tasks self-reported lower levels of self-control
than participants who completed the laboratory tasks. Analyses comparing participation patterns
for the laboratory measures of self-control and impulsivity (i.e., the stop-signal reaction-time
task and the delay discounting task) included only those participants who completed the
laboratory tasks, so t-tests could not compare differences on laboratory tasks between
participants who completed and did not complete the laboratory tasks. Participants who did not
complete the laboratory tasks were younger than participants who completed the laboratory
tasks, and the group of participants who did not complete the laboratory tasks included fewer
females than the group of participants who completed the laboratory tasks. Participants who did
versus did not complete the laboratory tasks did not differ on risk-taking at wave 1, prototype
perceptions, self-reported impulsivity, mother education, race, relationship status or parental
status. Supplementary regression analyses were conducted of the questionnaire data using only
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Table 1. Comparison of participation groups’ risk-taking, decision-making processes, self-control, impulsivity and demographics.
Lab Data

No Lab Data

t/2

Longitudinal
Data

No
Longitudinal
Data
M
SD
1.44
1.52

t/2

M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
Risk-Taking Time 1
1.68
1.42
1.77
1.55
.79
1.85
1.43
-3.12**
Risk-Taking Time 2
1.63
1.52
2.08
1.57
2.47*
Behavioral Intentions
.85
.63
.97
.64
2.21*
.89
.63
.94
.64
.94
Willingness
.72
.58
.82
.59
1.97*
.75
.58
.79
.59
.82
Attitudes
.87
.50
.75
.47
3.02** .77
.47
.87
.51
2.41*
Subjective Norms
.64
.47
.74
.54
2.45*
.64
.46
.77
.57
2.90**
Perceived Behavioral Control
2.48
1.03
2.69
.95
2.57* 2.54
1.02
2.63
.97
.99
Prototype Perceptions
.95
.29
.93
.32
-1.04
.94
.30
.95
.32
.71
Self-control
2.31
.73
2.17
.76
-2.25* 2.28
.74
2.18
.76
-1.58
Impulsivity
1.21
.54
1.27
.56
1.25
1.19
.56
1.32
.51
2.48*
Stop-Signal Reaction-Time
159.64 57.72 140.71 43.37 -1.49
Delay Discounting
-3.51
2.64
-3.14
2.29
.72
Age
20.80 4.79
19.97 3.01
-2.34* 20.68 4.42
19.97 3.47
-1.88
Female Gender
68.3%
56.9%
8.37* 66.3%
57.3%
4.42
Mother Education (Some
30.2%
32.9%
9.49
29.6%
35.1%
6.69
College)
White or Other Race
81.1%
84.2%
.96
82.0%
83.3%
.16
Committed Relationship Status 50.6%
52.1%
.12
51.0%
51.6%
.02
Non-parent
92.7%
93.8%
.26
93.6%
92.3%
.31
Note: Degrees of freedom (Dfs) for t-tests ranged from 392-578. Dfs for 2 tests ranged from 1-8. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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participants who provided laboratory data. All conclusions were the same irrespective of lab
subgroups.
Participants who provided longitudinal data reported higher levels of risk-taking at wave
1 than participants who did not provide longitudinal data. Levels of longitudinal risk-taking
could not be compared between participants who did and did not provide longitudinal data
because participants who did not provide longitudinal data had no values for longitudinal risktaking. Participants who did not provide longitudinal data reported more favorable attitudes and
subjective norms towards risk-taking than participants who provided longitudinal data.
Participants who did not provide longitudinal data reported higher levels of impulsivity relative
to participants who provided longitudinal data. Participants who did and did not provide
longitudinal data did not differ on levels of behavioral intentions, willingness, perceived
behavioral control, prototype perceptions, self-reported self-control, laboratory measures of selfcontrol or impulsivity, or any demographic variables.
Procedures
After obtaining IRB approval (see Appendix A), participants were recruited in the
beginning of the fall of 2012 from freshmen-level Psychology classes at the University of New
Orleans. Researchers attended the first classes of the semester to describe what participation
would entail and to solicit participants. This project involved three waves of data collection.
Individuals age 18 and older who were willing to participate in wave 2 laboratory visits were
provided with consent forms and wave 1 surveys to complete during the first class period.
During the wave 1 survey (see Appendix B), self-report data was collected on risk-taking
behavior, impulsivity, self-control, behavioral intentions, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived
behavioral control, willingness, prototype perceptions and demographics. Demographic variables
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were assessed using questions based on the recommendations of Entwistle and Astone (1994).
Specifically, participants’ age, sex, racial background and socioeconomic status (indexed by
mother’s highest level of education) were assessed. Participants also were requested to provide
their relationship status, and to indicate whether or not they were a parent, because being
involved in such relationships is related to lower levels of risk-taking behavior (e.g., Sampson,
Laub & Wimer, 2006). Additionally, participants responded to items addressing whether they are
currently prescribed and taking psychotropic medication, and if so, the name of the medication
was requested.
Participants provided their contact information including their phone number and UNO
email as part of the wave 1 survey. Researchers subsequently scheduled participants to come into
the lab to complete wave 2 computer-administered tasks at a time that was convenient for
participants during the semester. Phone calls and/or emails were made to all participants who
provided contact information. Participants who responded to contact were scheduled first, and
participants who did not respond were pursued by whichever contact method (phone or email)
was not attempted first. If participants continued to be unresponsive, researchers moved on to
schedule other participants. During the wave 2 lab visit, participants completed delay discounting
and stop-signal reaction-time tasks. The computerized tasks each took approximately 15 minutes
to complete and each participant was tested individually using the same computer. The delay
discounting task, used to index impulsivity, and the stop-signal reaction-time (SSRT) task, used
to measure self-control, were presented in a counter-balanced order (i.e., half of the participants
completed the delay discounting task first followed by the SSRT task while other participants
completed the tasks in the opposite order) to prevent order effects.
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At the end of the semester, a link to a wave 3 online survey was e-mailed to all
participants. The end-of-semester wave 3 online survey assessed participants’ risk-taking
behavior over the semester. At the end of the semester, a list of individuals who completed each
part of the project was provided to instructors so that instructors could provide extra credit to
students in their class.
Measures
The goal of this study was to assess between-person and within-person variability in
decision-making processes and risk-taking. Most variables are assessed across the four forms of
risk-taking to allow assessment of between-person and within-person variability. For each of the
four forms of risk-taking, participants responded to three items. The substance use items
referenced getting drunk, using tobacco and using drugs. Criminal involvement items referenced
theft, vandalism and doing something illegal. Risky sexual behavior items referenced having sex
with someone participants do not know well, having sex outside of a committed relationship and
having sex without a condom. Reckless driving items referenced driving over the speed limit,
texting while driving and driving after drinking alcohol.
Unfortunately, several items assessed had insufficient variability on the risk-taking
behavior outcome measure due to not being frequently endorsed. Two items were omitted from
the criminal behavior scale and one item was omitted from the risky sexual behavior scale due to
low response rates for these items. Specifically, the items omitted from the criminal behavior
scale indexed theft and vandalism. After omission of these items, the criminal involvement
measure included one item indexing whether participants had engaged in any general illegal
behavior. The item omitted from the risky sex scale tapped whether participants had sex with
someone they did not know well. The two items remaining in the sex scale included having sex
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outside of a committed relationship and having sex without a condom. No items were omitted
from the substance use and reckless driving scales. Although the exclusion of items was based on
the risk-taking behavior outcome measure, items referencing theft, vandalism and sex with
someone participants did not know well were removed from all decision-making measures as
well to keep assessments parallel across all constructs (except self-control and impulsivity).
Risk-taking behavior, behavioral intentions, willingness, attitudes, subjective norms,
perceived behavioral control and prototype perceptions were assessed at both the between-person
and within-person levels. For all variables except for prototype perceptions, the between-person
variables were computed as the mean of the nine items comprising each measure (i.e., the mean
across all forms of risk taking). The prototype perceptions measure included nine sets of six
items and thus the between-person variable for prototype perceptions was computed as the mean
of 54 items. Within-person variables were computed for each form of risk-taking by calculating
the mean of the items (or sets of items for prototype perceptions) separately for each form of
risk-taking (i.e., separate means for each of the four forms). Evidence of reliability was
calculated for the between-person and within-person variables when possible based on multiple
items. Reliabilities are shown in Table 2. Self-control and impulsivity were only assessed only at
the between-person level. Scoring for the measures is included in the measure description.
Risk-taking behavior. Risk-taking behavior was assessed twice – during the wave one
survey and during the wave three longitudinal online survey. The risk-taking behavior measure
was adapted from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2011) and the Normative Deviance Scale (Vazsonyi, Pickering, Belliston, Hessing & Junger,
2002). Following the format of the Normative Deviance Scale, risk-taking behavior items use the
stem “During the past 3 months, on how many days have you (engaged in each of the forms of
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risk-taking)?”The risk-taking behavior scale includes 9 items. Responses were made using a 7point response scale (0 = 0, 1 = 1, 2 = 2-3 times, 3= 4-5 times, 4 = 6-10 times, 5 = 11-20 times
and 6 = 20+ times). The forms of risk-taking were selected based on the literature previously
discussed which indicated that many late adolescents engage in these forms of risk-taking
although these forms of risk-taking are dangerous (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012). The most commonly assessed distinct behaviors within each form of risk-taking were
selected. That is, items included in the present study are similar to items used on the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2012) and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010) as well as on the Add Health questionnaire
(Harris et al., 2009). There is considerable evidence supporting the reliability and validity of
these or similar items. In Vazsonyi, Pickering, Junger and Hessing’s (2001) study, adolescents
ages 14 to 22 from four different countries were able to respond to items from the Normative
Deviance Scale in a reliable fashion and adolescents who reported lower self-control also
reported more risk-taking behavior.
Behavioral intentions. Behavioral intentions were measured during the wave one
survey. The behavioral intentions measure was modeled on items described by Piquero and
Tibbetts (1996). Behavioral intentions items ask participants “How likely do you think it is that
you will ____ one or more times in the next three months?” Participants respond to the nine
behavioral intentions items using a four-point response scale (0 = not at all likely, 1 = a little bit
likely, 2 = somewhat likely and 3 = very likely). In prior research, incoming freshmen college
students with a mean age of 18 were able to respond to the items in a reliable fashion (Gibbons
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& Gerrard, 1995). Behavioral intentions were significantly associated with risk-taking behavior
and predicted change in smoking behavior over time (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995).
Willingness. Willingness to engage in all four forms of risk-taking was measured during
the wave one survey. Nine willingness items were newly developed for this study. Willingness
items index participants’ responses to the questions, “How willing are you to ___ one or more
times during the next three months?” Responses were made using a four-point response scale (0
= not at all willing, 1 = a little bit willing, 2 = somewhat willing and 3 = very willing). In prior
research, young adults with a mean age of 18 were able to respond to the items in a reliable
fashion and willingness to use drugs was related to higher levels of substance use (Stock,
Gibbons, Walsh & Gerrard, 2011).
Attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. Attitudes, subjective
norms and perceived behavioral control items were collected during the wave one survey.
Attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control items were adapted from
Desrichard, Roché and Bègue (2007). The nine-item attitudes measure uses the stem, “How bad
or good do you consider each of the following?” to assess each of the forms of risk-taking.
Responses were made using a five-point response scale (0 = very bad, 1 = a little bad, 2 = not
good or bad, 3 = a little good, and 4 = very good). The nine subjective norms items ask “what
would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they saw you” engaging in each
of the forms of risk-taking. Responses were made using a five-point response scale (0 = strongly
disapprove, 1 = disapprove, 2 = neither approve nor disapprove, 3 = approve, and 4 = strongly
approve). The nine perceived behavioral control items ask “how easy is it to” engage in each of
the forms of risk-taking. Responses were made using a five-point response scale (0 = very
difficult, 1 = mostly difficult, 2 = not difficult or easy, 3 = mostly easy and 4 = very easy).
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Desrichard et al. (2007) showed that adolescents ages 13 to 19 were able to respond to the
attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control items in a reliable fashion. Attitudes
and subjective norms but not perceived behavioral control were significantly associated with
behavioral intentions to violate driving rules (Desrichard et al., 2007). In another study, adults
18 years and older were able to respond to the items in a reliable fashion and again, attitudes and
subjective norms but not perceived behavioral control significantly contributed to behavioral
intentions to wear safety gear while in-line skating (Deroche, Stephan, Castanier, Brewer &
Scanff, 2009).
Prototype Perceptions. Prototype perceptions were measured during the wave one
survey. The prototype perceptions measure, adapted from Wills, Gibbons, Gerrard, Murry and
Brody (2003), consists of nine sets of six items assessing the forms of risk-taking of interest.
Each set of items began with a direction for respondents to “Take a moment to think about
people your age who (engage in a specific form of risk-taking). We are not thinking about
anyone in particular, just your image of individuals who (engage in the particular form of risktaking).” The six items following the directive assess how popular, careless, smart, cool,
attractive and boring individuals who engage in that behavior are perceived to be by the
respondent. Responses were made using a four-point response scale (0 = not at all, 1 = a little
bit, 2 = somewhat and 3 = very). In Wills et al.’s (2003) study, adolescents with a mean age of
13 were able to respond to the items in a reliable fashion and favorable prototype perceptions of
substance users and sex engagers were related to risk-taking behavior. Prototype perceptions
were linked to risk-taking behavior primarily through willingness (Wills et al., 2003). In the
present study, items indexing unfavorable descriptors (i.e., careless, boring) were reverse-scored
so that high scores indicate favorable impressions of the prototype.
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Self-reported self-control. The Brief Self-Control Scale short version (Finkenauer et al.,
2005) was used as the self-report index of self-control. The scale measures the ability to override
or alter internal responses and to interrupt inappropriate behavior such as resisting acting on
impulse (Tangney et al., 2004), which is consistent with the conceptualization of self-control in
the present study. The Brief Self-Control Scale short version includes 11 items. For example, one
item was “I am good at resisting temptation.” Responses were made using a five-point response
scale (0 = strongly disagree, 1 = disagree, 2 = neither agree nor disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 =
strongly agree). In prior research using the long version of the Brief Self-Control Scale,
undergraduate students ranging in age from 18 to 35 were able to respond to the items in a
reliable fashion (Tangney et al., 2004). Low self-control was related to higher levels of
psychopathology, more problematic relationships and more alcohol abuse (Tangney et al., 2004).
Using the short version of the Brief Self-Control Scale, adolescents ages 10-14 years were able
to respond to the items in a reliable fashion (Finkenauer et al., 2005). Low self-control was
significantly related to higher levels of behavior problems (Finkenauer et al., 2005). In the
present study, self-control was only assessed at the between-person level. A between-person selfcontrol composite score was computed as the mean of the 11 Brief Self-Control Scale short
version items.
Lab-based self-control. The stop-signal reaction-time task (SSRT task; Verbruggen,
Logan & Stevens, 2008) was used as the laboratory measure of self-control. Using the SSRT
task, self-control was operationalized as the degree to which participants exhibited inhibitory
control. On each trial, participants were presented with one of two possible visual go signals:
press the ‘D’ key for a left-pointing arrow or the ‘K’ key for a right-pointing arrow (Verbruggen
et al., 2008). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible to go stimuli (Aron et
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al., 2007). On 25% of trials, randomly dispersed, a stop signal (auditory) was presented after the
go signal (Aron et al., 2007). The participants were instructed to do their best to inhibit the
response when the stop signal occurred (Aron et al., 2007). If the delay between the primary task
stimulus and the stop signal (stop-signal delay, or SSD) is short, participants are more likely to
successfully prevent the planned movement (Aron et al., 2007). When the delay between the
primary task stimulus and the stop-signal increases, participants are less likely to prevent the
planned movement, and are more likely to respond on the stop-signal trials (Verbruggen et al.,
2008). According to the horse-race model, response inhibition succeeds or fails depending on the
relative finishing time of the go process triggered by the primary task and the stop process that is
initiated by the stop signal (e.g., Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen et al., 2008). If the stop
process wins the race (finishes the race prior to the go process finishing), participants inhibit
their response (Verbruggen et al., 2008). If the go process finishes before the stop process
finishes, participants fail to inhibit their response (Verbruggen et al., 2008). The delay between
the presentation of the primary task stimulus and the stop signal varies (Aron et al., 2003). If
participants inhibit successfully, the delay for the stop-signal increases by 50 milliseconds on the
next trial, making subsequent inhibition more difficult. If participants do not successfully inhibit,
the delay decreases by 50 milliseconds on the following trial. The varying delays allow the SSRT
program to discover the time that the individual requires to successfully inhibit a response
approximately 50% of the time – this is the stop-signal reaction time (Aron et al., 2003; Logan,
1994). In terms of the horse-race model, the race between go and stop processes ends in a tie,
providing a sensitive estimate of inhibitory control (Logan, 1994). In prior research, high school
students and college students were able to respond to the SSRT task in a reliable fashion
(Carlotta, Borroni, Maffei & Fossati, 2011; Witte, 2009). Low self-control explained the link
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between childhood Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder symptoms and antisocial behavior
in a sample of high school students (Carlotta et al., 2011).
The SSRT program estimates variables including the mean stop-signal delay (SSD),
which is calculated from all SSD values, and the mean response time (RT) for all no-stop-signal
trials, calculated from all the RTs for no-signal trials (Verbruggen et al., 2008). The mean SSD is
then subtracted from the mean RT for all no-signal trials, providing an estimate of SSRT
(Verbruggen et al., 2008). The SSRT program also calculates z-scores and corresponding pvalues to indicate whether each participant inhibited significantly more or less than 50% of the
time (Verbruggen et al., 2008). Significant p-values indicate that the SSRT program was unable
to successfully estimate the SSRT for participants because SSRT is estimated based on the
assumption that participants successfully inhibit approximately 50% of the time (i.e., that there is
a tie in the race between go and stop processes; Logan, 1994; Verbruggen et al., 2008). SSRT
values for participants with significant p-values (i.e., those participants who inhibited
significantly more or less than 50% of the time) were dropped from the SSRT analyses. Ninetyfour participants (28.5% of participants who completed the laboratory tasks) had significant pvalues associated with their SSRT scores indicating that they inhibited significantly more or less
than 50% of the time, so these 94 participants’ SSRT values were dropped from analyses. Twohundred thirty six participants’ p-values associated with their SSRT scores were valid, and were
therefore utilized in the analyses. The likelihood of having valid versus invalid SSRT scores was
unrelated to all other variables. Specifically, the groups of participants with valid versus invalid
SSRT scores did not differ on self-reported self-control, t(323) = 1.32, p = .19, or impulsivity, t
(326) = -.535, p = .59. The groups did not differ on behavioral intentions across forms of risktaking, t(325) = .054, p = .96, or on willingness across forms of risk-taking, t(324) = -.123, p =
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.90. Additionally, the groups did not differ on attitudes, t(328) = .361, p = .75, subjective norms,
t(328) = -.611, p = .541, perceived behavioral control, t(326) = .617, p = .54, or prototype
perceptions, t(328) = -.183, p = .86, across forms of risk-taking. Finally, the valid versus invalid
SSRT score groups did not differ on risk-taking engagement across forms at wave 1, t(325)=
.120, p = .91, or at wave 3, t(299) = -.141, p = .89.
Self-reported impulsivity. The motor subscale of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) was used as the self-report measure of impulsivity. The motor
subscale indexes acting on the spur of the moment and fast reactions, which is consistent with
the conceptualization of impulsivity in the present study. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
instructions request that participants respond to items quickly without spending too much time
on any one item (for full scale instructions, see appendix). The motor subscale consisted of seven
statements such as “I act on the spur of the moment.” Responses were made using a four-point
response scale (0 = rarely/never, 1 = occasionally, 2 = often, and 3 = almost always/always). In
prior research, adolescents ages 11-18 (Gilbert et al., 2011; Nandagopal et al., 2011) and adults
with a mean age of 39 (Antonucci et al., 2006) were able to respond to the motor impulsivity
subscale items in a reliable fashion. Impulsivity as indexed by the motor subscale of the Barratt
Impulsiveness scale was significantly higher among adolescents ages 11-17 with Bipolar
Disorder compared to healthy controls (Gilbert et al., 2011) and was significantly higher among
adolescents age 11-18 with ADHD compared to healthy controls (Nandagopal et al., 2011), as
would be expected. In addition, Antonucci et al. (2006) reported a strong positive relationship
between orbitofrontal cortex volume and the motor subscale of the Barratt Impulsiveness scale
indicating that the motor subscale taps a brain area that is commonly associated with impulsivity.
In another study, only the motor subscale but not the non-planning or attentional subscales of the
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Barratt Impulsiveness scale was significantly related to higher levels of risk-taking as measured
by the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, which has been found to be related to self-report of
substance use and other forms of real-world risk-taking, suggesting that motor impulsivity
represents a distinct component of impulsivity that is particularly characteristic of individuals
prone to risk-taking (Holmes et al., 2009). Also, adult outpatient problem gamblers have been
found to have significantly higher motor impulsivity subscale scores compared to healthy
controls (Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian & Clark, 2009). In the present study, self-reported
impulsivity was measured only at the between-person level. A between-person impulsivity
composite score was computed as the mean of the seven motor impulsivity subscale items.
Lab-based impulsivity. The delay discounting task used to measure impulsivity in the
present study is described by Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, and De Wit (1999). Discounting
explains how much the value of a reward is decreased when its occurrence is delayed (Richards
et al., 1999). In Richards et al.’s (1999) study, healthy adults ages 21 to 35 years were able to
respond to the delay discounting task in a reliable fashion. Delay discounting was moderately
correlated with personality measures of impulsivity (Richards et al., 1999).
Introduction to and instructions (see Richards et al., 1999 for full task instructions) for the
delay discounting task were displayed on the computer screen and read aloud by the researchers
to participants. The introduction explained to participants that during this task they will be asked
to choose between different amounts of money available after different delays (Richards et al.,
1999). A sample item provided to participants as part of the computerized introduction to the test
was “would you rather have $10 for sure in 30 days or $2 for sure at the end of the session?”
Although the on-screen instructions indicated that participants would receive one of the rewards
that they chose, researchers instructed participants not to read the portion of the instructions that
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displayed regarding this. Instead the researchers informed participants that they would not
receive the outcomes that they chose, but their answers to the questions are important and they
should respond as if they would actually receive the rewards. Research indicates no difference
between discounting of real and hypothetical monetary outcomes (Johnson, Baker, & Bickel,
2007). When the participants began the task, the researcher left the room for approximately 15
minutes or until the participant completed the task.
The delay discounting task uses an adjusting-amount procedure that derives indifference
points between the delayed-standard (delayed $10) and immediate-adjusting (immediate amount
adjusts in increments of +.50) options for each of the five delays assessed (i.e., 0, 2, 30, 180 or
365 days; Richards et al., 1999). Indifference points indicate the smallest amount of money an
individual chose to receive immediately instead of the delayed standard amount ($10) at the
specific delay (Reynolds & Fields, 2012). Participants’ data were fit to the hyperbolic function,
Indifference point = A/(1 + kD), to calculate values for k. k provides a measure of the rate at
which each participant discounted reinforcers as a function of delay. In the hyperbolic function,
A is the fixed amount of the delayed reward ($10) and D is the length of the delay (0–365 days).
The distributions of k values were skewed, and this is to be expected because discounting
equation parameter estimation typically results in skewed distributions (e.g., Johnson & Bickel,
2002). k values were log-10-transformed for the purpose of analysis (Alessi & Petri, 2003).
Larger values of k indicate greater discounting and greater impulsivity.
Analysis Plan
Three sets of analyses are presented. First, the means and standard deviations are
presented with an emphasis on mean differences at both the between-person level and the withinperson level across the four forms of risk-taking. Second, bivariate associations among all
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variables at the between-person and within-person levels are reported focusing on the bivariate
associations among the predictors and between the predictors and risk-taking behavior. Third,
two sets of multivariate results are described. The first set of multivariate analyses tested
decision-making processes, self-control and impulsivity as predictors of concurrent and
longitudinal risk-taking. The second set of multivariate models tested behavioral intentions and
willingness as mediators of the effects of attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral
control and prototype perceptions on risk-taking. Analyses presented do not control for
demographic variables because analyses were conducted controlling for demographic variables
and results were not substantively different.
Between-person and within-person associations were analyzed using multilevel models in
Mplus. Multilevel models enable estimation of hierarchical data (Hox & Roberts, 2010). The
present study’s data has a two-level structure with within-person (level 1) and between-person
(level 2) effects. The primary outcomes of interest at both levels were the observed variables
risk-taking behavior, behavioral intentions and willingness. Between-person level composites
were group-mean centered so that the sample mean was 0 to facilitate interpretation. Withinperson composite scores were centered at the within-person level so that each person’s mean was
0 and scores were calculated as each person’s deviation from that mean to disentangle withinperson and between-person effects (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992).
Results
Means
Table 2 presents reliabilities and descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 3 presents
means for the within-person variables for each form of risk-taking with LSD post-hoc test results
comparing differences in mean levels across the forms of risk-taking.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities for All Variables
M
SD
Skew Kurtosis
Risk-Taking Time 1
1.57
1.19
.79
-.05
Substance Use
1.39
1.52
1.09
.29
Criminal Involvement
1.47
1.96
1.16
.09
Risky Sex
1.05
1.29
1.04
.36
Reckless Driving
2.36
1.56
.04
-1.08
Risk-Taking Time 2
1.65
1.18
.81
.27
Substance Use
1.32
1.48
1.11
.34
Criminal Involvement
1.59
2.08
1.09
-.16
Risky Sex
1.16
1.34
.86
-.14
Reckless Driving
2.49
1.56
-.13
-1.05
Attitudes
.80
.48
.56
.21
Substance Use
.99
.65
.47
-.06
Criminal Involvement
.74
.78
.85
.77
Risky Sex
.79
.71
.97
1.29
Reckless Driving
.69
.49
.82
1.14
Subjective Norms
.67
.50
.99
1.02
Substance Use
.83
.66
.83
.52
Criminal Involvement
.37
.65
1.69
2.30
Risky Sex
.65
.68
.91
.17
Reckless Driving
.86
.59
.51
.58
Perceived behavioral control 2.57
1.0
-.41
-.66
Substance Use
2.66
1.22
-.64
-.72
Criminal Involvement
2.56
1.33
-.56
-.85
Risky Sex
2.37
1.31
-.35
-1.04
Reckless Driving
2.69
.94
-.29
-.60
Behavioral intentions
.90
.63
.76
-.09
Substance Use
.86
.84
.77
-.36
Criminal Involvement
.74
1.07
1.16
-.15
Risky Sex
.64
.74
.79
-.55
Reckless Driving
1.38
.75
-.10
-.66
Prototype perceptions
.94
.31
.22
.50
Substance Use
1.03
.35
.19
.24
Criminal Involvement
.93
.44
.22
.10
Risky Sex
.89
.40
.44
.94
Reckless Driving
.90
.34
.56
1.09
Willingness
.76
.58
.80
.19
Substance Use
.80
.81
.84
-.20
Criminal Involvement
.51
.85
1.57
1.46
Risky Sex
.60
.72
.96
.00
Reckless Driving
1.14
.74
.18
-.69
Impulsivity 1
1.24
.55
.51
.15
Delay Discounting
-.35
2.61
.20
.82
Self-control 1
2.25
.74
.04
-.18
Stop-Signal Task
157.87 56.73
.16
2.40
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Range
0 - 5.42
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0 - 2.44
0 - 2.58
0-4
0-4
0 - 2.67
0-3
0 - 2.83
0-3
0-3
0 - 3.67
0-4
0-4
0-4
0-4
0-4
0-4
0-3
0-3
0-3
0-3
0-3
.06 - 1.99
0 - 2.22
0 - 2.17
0 - 2.58
.06 - 2.50
0-3
0-3
0-3
0-3
0-3
0-3
-9.78 - 4.85
.27 - 4
-102.66 - 351.08


.78
.67
N/A
.22
.65
.76
.63
N/A
.15
.71
.74
.58
N/A
.26
.54
.82
.67
N/A
.34
.66
.88
.81
N/A
.71
.61
.76
.64
N/A
.20
.60
.92
.65
.37
.62
.69
.78
.65
N/A
.25
.69
.71
N/A
.83
N/A

Items
9
3
1
2
3
9
3
1
2
3
9
3
1
2
3
9
3
1
2
3
9
3
1
2
3
9
3
1
2
3
54
18
6
12
18
9
3
1
2
18
7
N/A
11
N/A

Table 3. Means for Variables Across All Forms of Risk-taking and by Each Form of Risk-Taking.
All forms
Substance use Crime
Risky sex
Risky driving
M (SD)
1.57 (1.19)a
1.64 (1.17)a
.90 (.64)a
.76 (.59)a
.80 (.48)a
.68 (.49)a
2.57 (1.01)a

M (SD)
1.40 (1.52)b
1.31 (1.46)b
.87 (.84)a
.80 (.81)a
.99 (.65)b
.82 (.66)b
2.66 (1.22)b

M (SD)
1.48 (1.96)ab
1.59 (2.08)a
.74 (1.07)b
.52 (.85)b
.74 (.78)c
.37 (.65)
2.56 (1.33)a

M (SD)
1.05 (1.29)c
1.15 (1.33)b
.64 (.74)c
.60 ( .72)c
.79 (.71)ac
.65 (.68)a
2.37 (1.31)

M (SD)
2.35 (1.56)
2.49 (1.55)c
1.38 (.75)
1.14 (.74)
.68 (.48)c
.86 (.59)b
2.69 (.94)b

F(4,1564-4,
3316)

Risk-Taking Time 1
115.29***
Risk-Taking Time 2
80.81***
Behavioral Intentions
136.99***
Willingness
123.75***
Attitudes
38.51***
Subjective Norms
124.48***
Perceived Behavioral
19.83***
Control
Prototype Perceptions
.94 (.31)a
1.04 (.35)
.93 (.44)ab
.89 (.41)b
.91 (.35)b
33.03***
Note: Within each row, means sharing a common subscript are not statistically different at α = .05 according to LSD post-hoc
tests. *** p < .001.
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The means in Table 3 are the same as the means in Table 2. The mean level of overall risk-taking
behavior was relatively low for this sample, corresponding to scores of approximately 1 to 3
instances of engagement. Risky sexual behavior was engaged in least frequently and reckless
driving was engaged in most frequently relative to the other forms of risk-taking. Corresponding
to the low levels of engagement in risk-taking, decision-making processes were relatively
unfavorable to risk-taking. The mean level of behavioral intentions and willingness corresponded
to respondents being between “not at all” and “a little bit” willing or planning to engage in risktaking behavior, which is consistent with, although lower than the extent to which participants
reported engaging in the risk-taking behaviors. Participants reported the lowest levels of
behavioral intentions and willingness for risky sex and crime, respectively. Behavioral intentions
and willingness were highest for reckless driving. The mean attitudes score corresponded to
responses of considering risk-taking to be between “very bad” and “a little bad” and the mean
subjective norms score corresponded to responses indicating that individuals important to the
respondents would “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove” of risk-taking behavior. Attitudes were
most favorable towards substance use and least favorable towards reckless driving and crime.
Subjective norms were least favorable towards crime and most favorable towards reckless
driving and substance use relative to the other forms of risk-taking. The mean of perceived
behavioral control corresponded to responses considering risk-taking engagement to be between
“not difficult or easy” and “mostly easy,” with risky sex being considered the least accessible
behavior and reckless driving and substance use being considered the most accessible behaviors
relative to the other forms of risk-taking.
In sum, mean levels of risk-taking were relatively low for this sample, and decisionmaking processes were generally unfavorable towards risk-taking. Participants endorsed reckless
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driving as the most frequently engaged in behavior, and in accord with this, participants reported
more behavioral intentions and willingness to engage in reckless driving relative to the other
forms of risk-taking. Risk-taking engagement was lowest in the risky sex domain, and behavioral
intentions were also lowest for the sexual form of risk-taking.
Correlations
Intraclass correlations, reflecting the proportion of the total variance in responses that is
at the between-person level, are shown along the diagonal in Table 4. The intraclass correlations
show that most of the variability in risk-taking, behavioral intentions, willingness, attitudes and
subjective norms was across forms of risk-taking rather than across individuals (i.e., ICCs < .50).
Variability in perceived behavioral control and prototype perceptions was nearly equally
distributed across forms of risk-taking and across individuals. The intraclass correlations provide
evidence that analyses should test both between-person and within-person associations.
Associations at the between-person level are shown by the correlations above the
diagonal in Table 4. When adolescents experienced more behavioral intentions (averaged across
more forms of risk-taking), adolescents reported more willingness, more favorable attitudes,
more favorable subjective norms, more perceived behavioral control and more favorable
prototype perceptions (averaged across more forms of risk-taking). Decision-making processes,
self-reported self-control and self-reported impulsivity were consistently associated with risktaking behavior but laboratory measures of self-control and impulsivity were not consistently
linked to risk-taking.
Associations at the within-person level are shown by the correlations below the diagonal
in Table 4. Consistent with the between-person correlations, the predictor variables were
associated with one another and with risk-taking at the within-person level. The within-person
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correlations linked more behavioral intentions, more willingness, more favorable attitudes, more
favorable subjective norms, more perceived behavioral control and more favorable prototype
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Table 4. Correlations between Decision-Making Variables, Self-Control, Impulsivity and Risk-Taking.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1. Risk-Taking Time 1
.34
.53*** .45*** .40*** .20*** .17*** .25*** .07*** -.17***
.13*** -4.06
-.46***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
*
2. Risk-Taking Time 2
.91
.30
.54
.45
.21
.16
.34
.05
-.19
.15
-1.74
-.39
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
3. Behavioral Intentions
.52
.49
.32
.32
.17
.14
.19
.06
-.11
.08
-1.97
-.34***
4. Willingness
.41*** .37*** .28*** .35
.17*** .13*** .16*** .06*** -.12***
.09*** -2.55
-.31***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
5. Attitudes
.10
.09
.08
.08
.35
.13
.09
.05
-.09
.06
-1.23
-.16*
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
6. Subjective Norms
.13
.12
.10
.11
.07
.39
.06
.04
-.08
.05
.67
-.15
7. Perceived Behavioral
.23*** .22*** .14*** .12*** .08*** .07*** .58
.04*** -.04
.08*** -2.9
-.23
Control
8. Prototype Perceptions
.04*** .04*** .03*** .03*** .02*** .02*** .02*** .49
-.03***
.03*** -2.04
-.03
9. Self-control
-.11*** -3.99
.02
10. Impulsivity
.04
-.04
11. Stop-Signal Task
-12.77
12. Delay Discounting
Note: Between-person correlations are shown above the diagonal. Within-person correlations are shown below the diagonal. Intraclass
correlations (underlined) are shown along the diagonal. *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001.
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perceptions with one another. Adolescents engaged more in the forms of risk-taking for which
they experienced more behavioral intentions, more willingness, more favorable attitudes, more
favorable subjective norms, more perceived behavioral control and more favorable prototype
perceptions. In sum, self-reported predictors are consistently associated with one another and
with risk-taking at both the between-person and within-person levels. However, laboratory-based
measures of self-control and impulsivity are not associated with their self-report counterparts or
with other self-reported variables.
Multivariate Analyses Predicting Risk-Taking Concurrently and Longitudinally
Four sets of multi-level regression models were fit to predict risk-taking behavior
concurrently and longitudinally, using self-reported self-control and impulsivity data and using
laboratory self-control and impulsivity data. Predictors at the between-person level included
behavioral intentions, willingness, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control,
prototype perceptions, self-control and impulsivity. Three two-way interactions – self-control
behavioral intentions, impulsivity

self-control and impulsivity

willingness – also were

included in the models. Predictors at the within-person level included behavioral intentions,
willingness, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and prototype perceptions.
Concurrent models tested wave 1 variables as predictors of wave 1 risk-taking, whereas
longitudinal models tested wave 1 predictors of wave 3 risk-taking controlling for wave 1 risktaking at both the between-person and within-person levels.
Table 5 summarizes results from the univariate and multivariate analyses predicting risktaking behavior cross-sectionally and longitudinally using self-reported self-control and
impulsivity data. Univariate analyses are analogous to, and show the same pattern of results as,
the correlations presented in Table 4 and discussed previously. Univariate analyses are provided
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Table 5. Univariate and Multivariate Associations Between Predictors and Risk-Taking (Using Self-reported Self-control and
Impulsivity).
Cross-sectional
Longitudinal
Univariate
Multivariate
Univariate
Multivariate
B
SE
B*
B
SE
B*
B
SE
B*
B
SE
B*
Between-Person Level
Behavioral Intentions (BI)
1.52 .06 .89*** 1.09 .15 .64*** .62 .14 .37*** .61 .20 .36**
Willingness (WL)
1.53 .07 .85*** .52 .17 .28*** .43 .12 .24*** .09 .19 .05
Attitudes
1.12 .09 .56*** -.06 .08 -.03
.11 .09 .05
-.06 .11 -.03
Subjective Norms
.84 .11 .43*** -.04 .09 -.02
.02 .09 .01
-.11 .12 -.05
Perceived Behavioral
.34 .04 .35*** .05 .03 .05
.08 .04 .07*
.05 .04 .05
Control
Prototype Perceptions
.85 .17 .27*** -.16 .12 -.04
-.10 .15 -.03
-.19 .14 -.05
Self-control (SC)
-.41 .06 -.31*** -.03 .05 -.02
-.02 .06 -.01
-.01 .06 -.00
Impulsivity (IM)
.60 .09 .34*** .05 .06 .02
.11 .08 .07
.05 .08 .03
Risk-Taking 1
.49 .07 .54*** .48 .07 .53***
SC X BI
-.23 .07 -.12***
-.13 .10 -.07
IM X SC
.02 .10 .00
.05 .10 .02
IM X WL
.09 .10 .03
.00 .14 .00
80%
76%
Within-Person Level
BI
1.24 .04 .63*** .89 .07 .46*** .65 .09 .32*** .60 .09 .30***
WL
1.28 .05 .57*** .52 .08 .23*** .50 .09 .22*** .10 .11 .05
Attitudes
.47 .07 .16*** -.05 .06 -.02
.11 .07 .04
-.09 .07 -.03
Subjective Norms
.62 .07 .21*** -.12 .06 -.04*
.18 .08 .06*
.02 .09 .01
Perceived Behavioral
.48 .05 .25*** .09 .04 .05**
.17 .05 .09*** .08 .04 .04
Control
Prototype Perceptions
.64 .12 .11*** .03 .09 .00
.24 .13 .04
.08 .13 .01
Risk-Taking 1
.41 .05 .36*** .38 .05 .34***
44%
39%
Note: Values in univariate columns report results of analyses when each variable was regressed independently on risk-taking.
Multivariate analyses included all main effects regressed on risk-taking simultaneously. Interactions were tested individually as a
second step. values are from multivariate analyses which included all main effects.* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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primarily for comparison to the multivariate analyses. In the concurrent multivariate models, the
predictors accounted for 80% of the between-person variance in risk-taking at wave 1.
Adolescents reporting more behavioral intentions and more willingness (averaged across forms
of risk-taking) reported more risk-taking behavior. The self-control

behavioral intentions

interaction was a significant predictor of risk-taking behavior averaged across forms of risktaking. As shown in Figure 3, simple slopes analyses indicated that behavioral intentions were
more strongly associated with higher levels of risk-taking at low levels of self-control, b = 1.65,
SE = .05, p < .001, than at high levels of self-control, b = 1.31, SE = .07, p < .001.
The predictors accounted for 44% of the within-person variance in wave 1 risk-taking.
Adolescents reported engaging more in the forms of risk-taking for which they reported more
behavioral intentions, more willingness, more perceived behavioral control and less favorable
subjective norms.
Longitudinally, the predictors accounted for 76% of the between-person variance in wave
3 risk-taking. Adolescents who reported more risk-taking at wave 1 also reported more risktaking at wave 3. Adolescents who reported more behavioral intentions at wave 1 reported more
risk-taking at wave 3.
The predictors accounted for 39% of the within-person variance in wave 3 risk-taking.
Adolescents reported consistency in the forms of risk-taking at waves 1 and 3. Adolescents
engaged more often in the forms of risk taking for which they experienced more behavioral
intentions at wave 1.
Table 6 summarizes results from the univariate and multivariate analyses predicting risktaking behavior cross-sectionally and longitudinally using laboratory measures of self-control
and impulsivity. Again, univariate analyses are provided for comparison to the multivariate
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Figure 3. Fitted regression equation showing association between behavioral intentions and risktaking behavior at high and low levels of self-control.
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Table 6. Univariate and Multivariate Associations Between Predictors and Risk-Taking (Using Laboratory-based Self-Control And
Impulsivity).
Cross-sectional
Longitudinal
Univariate
Multivariate
Univariate
Multivariate
B
SE B*
B
SE B*
B
SE B*
B
SE B*
Between-Person Level
Behavioral Intentions (BI)
1.52 .06 .89*** 1.43 .22 .83*** .62 .14 .37*** .72 .24 .42**
Willingness (WL)
1.53 .07 .85*** .15 .23 .09
.43 .12 .24*** .08 .26 .04
Attitudes
1.12 .09 .56*** -.07 .14 -.03
.11 .09 .05
-.00 .14 -.00
Subjective Norms
.84 .11 .43*** -.12 .12 -.05
.02 .09 .01
-.10 .14 -.05
Perceived Behavioral
.34 .04 .35*** .13 .04 .13**
.08 .04 .07*
.05 .05 .05
Control
Prototype Perceptions
.85 .17 .27*** .05 .16 .01
-.10 .15 -.03
-.03 .18 -.01
Self-control (SC)
-.00 .00 -.09
-.00 .00 -.03
.00 .00 .02
.00 .00 .03
Impulsivity (IM)
-.08 .02 -.22*** .01 .02 .02
.00 .02 .00
.03 .02 .08
Risk-Taking 1
.49 .07 .54*** .43 .10 .49***
SC X BI
-.00 .00 -.03
-.00 .00 -.09
IM X SC
-.29 .19 -.13
.00 .00 .12*
IM X WL
.12 .15 .04
-.03 .04 -.05
86%
81%
Within-Person Level
BI
1.24 .04 .63*** .93 .12 .48*** .65 .09 .32*** .60 .09 .30***
WL
1.28 .05 .57*** .50 .14 .23*** .50 .09 .22*** .10 .11 .05
Attitudes
.47 .07 .16*** -.14 .09 -.05
.11 .07 .04
-.02 .10 -.00
Subjective Norms
.62 .07 .21*** -.12 .09 -.04
.18 .08 .06*
-.04 .13 -.01
Perceived Behavioral
.48 .05 .25*** .06 .06 .03
.17 .05 .09*** .08 .04 .04
Control
Prototype Perceptions
.64 .12 .11*** .05 .16 .00
.24 .13 .04
.08 .13 .01
Risk-Taking 1
.41 .05 .36*** .38 .05 .34***
43%
39%
Note: Values in univariate columns report results of analyses when each variable was regressed independently on risk-taking.
Multivariate analyses included all main effects regressed on risk-taking simultaneously. Interactions were tested individually as a
second step. values are from multivariate analyses which included all main effects. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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analyses which will be discussed. Most of the information provided in Table 6 is redundant with
the results found using self-reported self-control and impulsivity data. The novel information
provided in Table 6 involves the laboratory-based measures of self-control and impulsivity, and
thus only the self-control and impulsivity effects will be discussed. Concurrently, the predictors
accounted for 86% of the between-person variance in risk-taking at wave 1. Laboratory-based
measures of self-control and impulsivity and interactions involving these variables did not
predict risk-taking.
Longitudinally, the predictors accounted for 81% of the between-person variance in risktaking at wave 3. Similar to the cross-sectional findings, laboratory-based measures of selfcontrol and impulsivity did not uniquely predict risk-taking. However, the self-control
impulsivity interaction was a significant predictor of risk-taking behavior averaged across forms
of risk-taking. As shown in Figure 4, simple slopes analyses indicated that impulsivity was more
strongly associated with higher levels of risk-taking at high levels of self-control, b = .069, SE =
.00, p < .001, than at low levels of self-control, b = -.05, SE = .00, p < .001.
Concluding, behavioral intentions and willingness were the primary predictors of risktaking behavior at both the between-person and within-person levels. These results justify
conducting the analyses testing mediation effects of the predictors to risk-taking through
behavioral intentions and willingness, which will be reviewed next.
Mediation Analyses Predicting Risk-Taking Concurrently and Longitudinally
Four multi-level mediation models were fit to predict risk-taking behavior concurrently
and longitudinally through behavioral intentions and willingness, using self-reported self-control
and impulsivity data and using laboratory-based self-control and impulsivity data. The first
mediation models tested included only the proposed paths. Specifically, in the proposed, initially
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Figure 4. Fitted regression equation showing association between impulsivity and risk-taking
behavior at high and low levels of self-control.
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tested models, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and self-control were
included as predictors of behavioral intentions at the between-person level. Prototype perceptions
and impulsivity were included as predictors of willingness at the between-person level. Direct
paths from behavioral intentions, willingness, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral
control, prototype perceptions, self-control and impulsivity to risk-taking behavior also were
included at the between-person level in the proposed, initially tested models. Predictors at the
within-person level were analogous but did not include self-control or impulsivity. These models
provided a poor fit to the data. Specifically, the models using self-reported self-control and
impulsivity data provided a poor fit both using concurrent,
.54, RMSEA = .24, and longitudinal risk-taking data,

(12) = 1578.31, p < .001, CFI =

(16) = 2047.95, p = .00, CFI = .46,

RMSEA = .24. Similarly, the models using laboratory-based measures of self-control and
impulsivity provided a poor fit both concurrently,
= .27, and longitudinally,

(12) = 797.94, p = .00, CFI = .495, RMSEA

(16) = 976.35, p = .00, CFI = .45, RMSEA = .26. Additional paths

were added to the proposed mediation models to improve model fit. Specifically, in the modified
model predicting concurrent risk-taking, attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral
control and prototype perceptions were modeled as predictors of behavioral intentions,
willingness, and risk-taking behavior at both between-person and within-person levels. Selfcontrol and impulsivity were modeled as predictors of behavior intentions, willingness, and risktaking behavior at the between-person level only. Behavioral intentions and willingness were
modeled as predictors of risk-taking behavior at both the between-person and within-person
levels. Finally, correlation terms were added between behavioral intentions and willingness at
both the between-person and within-person levels. The mediation models predicting longitudinal
risk-taking were similar to those predicting concurrent risk-taking, with six additional paths.
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Specifically, risk-taking behavior at wave 1 was modeled as a predictor of behavioral intentions,
willingness and risk-taking behavior at wave 3 at both the between-person and within-person
levels.
Concurrent models tested wave 1 variables as predictors of wave 1 risk-taking, whereas
longitudinal models tested wave 1 predictors of wave 3 risk-taking controlling for wave 1 risktaking at both the between-person and within-person levels. The modified models provided a
better fit to the data. Specifically, the modified models provided a perfect fit to the crosssectional and longitudinal data because the models were just-identified.
Table 7 summarizes univariate regression results, multivariate direct effects predicting
risk-taking and multivariate indirect effects predicting risk-taking through behavioral intentions
and willingness using self-reported self-control and impulsivity data concurrently and
longitudinally. The key elements in this table are the results from the multivariate indirect effect
analyses which appear in the latter columns of the cross-sectional and longitudinal portions of
the table. Interpretation focuses primarily on the indirect effects. Figure 5 presents standardized
effects for the cross-sectional modified mediation model at the between-person level.
Concurrently, more favorable attitudes, more favorable subjective norms, more perceived
behavioral control, more favorable prototype perceptions, lower levels of self-control and higher
levels of impulsivity predicted risk-taking (averaged across forms) through more behavioral
intentions. More favorable attitudes, more favorable subjective norms, more perceived
behavioral control, more favorable prototype perceptions, lower levels of self-control and higher
levels of impulsivity significantly predicted more risk-taking (averaged across forms) through
more willingness. Because the univariate effects were significant, the indirect effects were
significant, and the direct effects were no longer significant when the indirect effects were
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Table 7. Direct and Indirect Effects through Behavioral Intentions and Willingness to Risk-Taking (Using Self-reported Self-control
and Impulsivity).
Cross-sectional
Longitudinal
Multivariate
Multivariate
Univaria Direct Indirect Indirect Univariate Direct Indirect Indirect
te
to
through through
to
through through
RiskBI
WL
RiskBI
WL
Taking
Taking
Between-Person Level
Behavioral Intentions (BI)
.89***
.65***
.37***
.37**
Willingness (WL)
.85***
.28***
.24***
.06
Attitudes
.56*** -.03
.21***
.12**
.05
-.01
.05*
.01
Subjective Norms
.43*** -.02
.11***
.04*
.01
-.06
.03*
.00
Perceived Behavioral Control .35***
.05
.12***
.04**
.07*
.05
.02
.00
Prototype Perceptions
.27*** -.05
.06*
.04*
-.03
-.07
.02
.01
Self-control
-.31*** -.02
-.07**
-.03
-.01
-.00
-.01
-.00
Impulsivity
.34***
.03
.08**
.03*
.07
.02
.02
.00
Risk-Taking Time 1
.54***
.52*** .24**
.03
Within-Person Level
Behavioral Intentions
.63***
.46***
.32***
.28***
Willingness
.57***
.23***
.22***
.05
Attitudes
.16*** -.02
.05***
.03***
.06
-.03
.02**
.00
Subjective Norms
.21*** -.04*
.11***
.08***
.04*
.00
.04***
.01
Perceived Behavioral Control .25***
.05**
.11***
.04***
.09***
.04
.03***
.00
Prototype Perceptions
.11***
.00
.04***
.02***
.04
.01
.01*
.00
Risk-Taking Time 1
.36***
.34*** .17***
.03
Note: Values in univariate columns report results of analyses when each variable was regressed independently on risk-taking.
Multivariate analyses included all main effects regressed on risk-taking simultaneously. Interactions were tested individually as a
second step. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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included in the model, the effects of attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control,
prototype perceptions and impulsivity on risk-taking were fully mediated through the
combination of behavioral intentions and willingness. The effect of self-control on risk-taking
was fully mediated through behavioral intentions.
Figure 6 presents standardized effects for the cross-sectional modified mediation model
at the within-person level. Within-people, engagement in the forms of risk-taking was predicted
by more favorable attitudes, more favorable subjective norms, more perceived behavioral control
and more favorable prototype perceptions through behavioral intentions. Engagement in the
forms of risk-taking was also predicted by more favorable attitudes, more favorable subjective
norms, more perceived behavioral control and more favorable prototype perceptions through
more willingness. The effects of attitudes and prototype perceptions were completely mediated
through the combination of behavioral intentions and willingness. Because the indirect effects
were significant and the direct effects were still significant with the indirect effects in the model,
the effects of subjective norms and perceived behavioral control on risk-taking were partially
mediated through the set of behavioral intentions and willingness.
Figure 7 presents standardized effects for the longitudinal modified mediation model at
the between-person level. Longitudinally and between-people, more favorable attitudes, more
favorable subjective norms and more risk-taking at wave 1 predicted risk-taking at wave 3
through more behavioral intentions (averaged across forms of risk-taking). Because the
univariate effects were not significant but the indirect effects were significant, attitudes and
subjective norms exhibited significant indirect effects on risk-taking through behavioral
intentions. Risk-taking at wave 1 exhibited a significant indirect effect on risk-taking at wave 3
through behavioral intentions.
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Figure 8 presents standardized effects for the longitudinal modified mediation model at
the within-person level. Within-people, engagement in the forms of risk-taking was predicted by
more favorable attitudes, more favorable subjective norms, more perceived behavioral control,
more prototype perceptions and more risk-taking at wave 1 through more behavioral intentions.
The effects of subjective norms and perceived behavioral control on risk-taking were completely
mediated through behavioral intentions. Attitudes, prototype perceptions and risk-taking at wave
1 exhibited significant indirect effects on risk-taking at wave 3 through behavioral intentions.
Table 8 summarizes univariate regression results, multivariate direct effects predicting
risk-taking and multivariate indirect effects predicting risk-taking through behavioral intentions
and willingness using laboratory measures of self-control and impulsivity concurrently and
longitudinally. The key elements in this table are the results from the multivariate indirect effect
analyses which appear in the latter two columns of the cross-sectional and longitudinal portions
of the table. Interpretation focuses primarily on the indirect effects. Most information provided in
Table 8 is redundant with results just discussed. The novel information in Table 8 involves the
laboratory-based measures of self-control and impulsivity, and interpretation will focus on selfcontrol and impulsivity. Concurrently, higher levels of impulsivity predicted more risk-taking
(averaged across forms of risk-taking) through less behavioral intentions. The effect of
impulsivity on risk-taking was fully mediated through behavioral intentions.
Concluding, decision-making processes predicted risk-taking more consistently through
behavioral intentions than through willingness. Attitudes, subjective norms and perceived
behavioral control consistently predicted risk-taking through behavioral intentions, in concurrent
and longitudinal models, using self-reported and laboratory-based self-control and impulsivity
data, and at both the between-person and within-person levels. Prototype perceptions predicted
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Table 8. Direct and Indirect Effects through Behavioral Intentions and Willingness to Risk-taking (Using Laboratory-based Selfcontrol and Impulsivity).
Cross-sectional
Longitudinal
Multivariate
Multivariate
Univari Direct Indirect Indirect Univariate Direct Indirect Indirect
ate
to
through through
to
through through
RiskBI
WL
RiskBI
WL
Taking
Taking
Between-Person Level
Behavioral Intentions (BI)
.89*** .83***
.37***
.45**
Willingness (WL)
.85*** .09
.24***
.05
Attitudes
.56*** -.04
.29***
.04
.05
.02
.07*
.01
Subjective Norms
.43*** -.02
.14**
.01
.01
-.07
.04
.00
Perceived Behavioral Control
.35*** .12**
.18***
.02
.07*
.05
.00
.00
Prototype Perceptions
.27*** .01
.04
.00
-.03
-.03
.00
.00
Self-control
-.09
-.03
-.03
-.00
.02
.02
.00
.00
Impulsivity
-.22*** .02
-.13**
-.01
.00
.09
-.04
-.00
Risk-Taking 1
.54***
.46*** .33**
.03
Within-Person Level
Behavioral Intentions
.63*** .47***
.32***
.30***
Willingness
.57*** .23***
.22***
.05
Attitudes
.16*** -.05
.07***
.04***
.04
-.00
.04*
.00
Subjective Norms
.21*** -.03
.09***
.08**
.06*
-.02
.03**
.01
Perceived Behavioral Control
.25*** .04
.09***
.03*
.09***
.05
.03*
.00
Prototype Perceptions
.11*** .00
.03
.03*
.04
-.03
.00
.00
Risk-Taking 1
.36***
.32*** .19***
.02
Note: Values in univariate columns report results of analyses when each variable was regressed independently on risk-taking.
Multivariate analyses included all main effects regressed on risk-taking simultaneously. Interactions were tested individually as a
second step. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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risk-taking through both behavioral intentions and willingness in some but not all models.
Impulsivity predicted risk-taking through behavioral intentions in more models than self-control
predicted risk-taking through behavioral intentions.
A summary of all results relevant to the hypotheses is provided in Table 9. There was
much support for the effect of behavioral intentions on risk-taking. Behavioral intentions
consistently accounted for the link between perceived behavioral control and risk-taking, and to a
lesser extent behavioral intentions accounted for the links between attitudes and risk-taking and
between subjective norms and risk-taking. Willingness was linked with risk-taking less so than
was behavioral intentions. Only some to minimal support was provided for the hypotheses that
willingness would account for the links between prototype perceptions and risk-taking and
between impulsivity and risk-taking. There was some support for the hypothesis that behavioral
intentions would account for the effect of self-control on risk-taking. There was minimal support
that the association between behavioral intentions and risk-taking would be stronger at higher
than lower levels of self-control.
Discussion
This study tested reasoned and reactive decision-making processes, self-control and
impulsivity as predictors of which adolescents are most likely to engage in risk-taking and why
an adolescent may engage in one form of risk-taking but not another form of risk-taking. The
study addressed three themes. It tested dual-process decision-making models, assessed betweenperson and within-person variations in risk-taking behavior, and attempted to integrate decisionmaking models and trait models of risk-taking. Results will be discussed according to themes.
Between-person and Within-person Variations in Risk-Taking
The present study addressed why some individuals take more risks than other individuals
and why an individual may engage in one form of risk-taking but not another form of risk-taking.
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Table 9. Summary of Results.
Hypothesis
Level of
Support
1. Behavioral
Consistent
intentions  RiskTaking
2. Attitudes 
Behavioral Intentions

Consistent

Attitudes  RiskTaking through
Behavioral Intentions

Consistent

3. Subjective Norms
 Behavioral
Intentions

Consistent

Explanation
Significant multivariate cross-sectional &
longitudinal, between-person & within-person

Significant direct effects from attitudes to
behavioral intentions concurrently and
longitudinally, between-person & withinperson
Indirect effects through behavioral intentions
concurrently & longitudinally, betweenperson & within-person
Significant direct effects from subjective
norms to behavioral intentions concurrently
and longitudinally, between-person & withinperson

Consistent
Subjective norms 
Risk-Taking through
Behavioral Intentions

Indirect effects through behavioral intentions
concurrently & longitudinally, betweenperson & within-person

4. Perceived
Behavioral Control 
Behavioral Intentions

Consistent

Significant direct effects from perceived
behavioral control to behavioral intentions
concurrently and longitudinally, betweenperson and within-person

Perceived Behavioral
Control  RiskTaking through
Behavioral Intentions

Consistent

Indirect effects through behavioral intentions
concurrently and longitudinally, betweenperson & within-person

5. Willingness 
Risk-Taking

Inconsistent

6. Prototype
perceptions 
Willingness

Consistent

Significant multivariate between-person &
within-person effects concurrently but not
longitudinally
Significant direct effects from prototype
perceptions to willingness concurrently and
longitudinally at both between-person &
within-person levels.

Inconsistent

Indirect effect through willingness at
between-person & within-person levels
concurrently. No significant indirect effects
through willingness longitudinally.

Prototype Perceptions
 Risk-Taking
through Willingness
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8. Willingness X
Impulsivity  RiskTaking

No support

No interaction effects were found consistent
with this hypothesis.

Table 9 Continued. Summary of Results.
7. Impulsivity X SelfNo support
control  RiskTaking

No interaction effects were found consistent
with this hypothesis.

8. Willingness X
Impulsivity  RiskTaking

No support

No interaction effects were found consistent
with this hypothesis.

9. Impulsivity 
Risk-Taking through
Willingness

Inconsistent

Indirect effect on risk-taking through
willingness only concurrently and using selfreported impulsivity

10. Behavioral
Intentions X Selfcontrol  RiskTaking
11. Self-control 
Risk-Taking through
Behavioral Intentions

No support

No interaction effects were found consistent
with this hypothesis.

Inconsistent

indirect effect through behavioral intentions
concurrently & longitudinally using selfreported self-control
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Results yielded approximately equal variability in risk-taking between-people averaged
across forms and within-people looking at each specific form of risk-taking. In other words,
individuals who engaged in one form of risk-taking were likely to engage in other forms of risktaking as well, but within-person results explained the imperfect correlation between different
forms of risk-taking. Thus, considering variations in risk-taking at both the between-person and
within-person levels comprehensively addressed the questions of interest.
In addition to describing the variability at both the between-person and within-person
levels, the present study evaluated whether decision-making processes predicted risk-taking
similarly at both the between-person and within-person levels. In most analyses, predictors of
risk-taking functioned similarly at both the between-person and within-person levels. For
example, individuals with more behavioral intentions engaged in more risk-taking averaged
across forms. Also, individuals engaged in the specific forms of risk-taking for which they
experienced higher behavioral intentions. Some effects were apparent only at the within-person
level and not at the between-person level. For instance, engagement in the forms of risk-taking
was predicted by prototype perceptions through behavioral intentions, but prototype perceptions
did not predict risk-taking between-people averaged across forms. An exclusive emphasis on
risk-taking averaged across forms would have led to erroneous inferences (Nesselroade, 2002).
Most research focusing on predictors of risk-taking has been dominated by a betweenperson orientation (e.g., Ford & Blumenstein, 2013; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Zuckerman &
Kuhlman, 2000). Between-person analyses are beneficial for explaining why individuals who
engage in one form of risk-taking are likely to engage in other forms of risk-taking as well
(Fleeson, 2004). For instance, individuals with higher levels of behavioral intentions across
forms of risk-taking are more likely to engage in substance use, criminal behavior, risky sexual
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behavior and reckless driving. Mean-level differences averaged across forms of risk-taking
provide the most useful information when the correlation between different risk-taking behaviors
is strong (MacDonald, Li & Bäckman, 2009). However, the correlation between different forms
of risk-taking is usually modest (Figner & Weber, 2011), as was the case in the present study.
Within-person analyses are beneficial for explaining why an individual may choose to engage in
one form of risk-taking but not another form of risk-taking. The present study demonstrates the
value of adopting a comprehensive approach to understanding multiple forms of risk-taking.
Future research should include assessments of between-person as well as within-person
variability in risk-taking behavior.
Dual Process Models of Decision-Making
This study tested dual process models of decision-making as predictors of risk-taking
behavior. It assessed the evidence for the predictive power of the reasoned and reactive decisionmaking processes, and whether the two processes contribute to risk-taking through distinct
pathways.
This study provided strong evidence supporting the use of rational decision-making
processes – specifically processes from the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) – for
predicting behavioral intentions and risk-taking. Behavioral intentions were the most consistent
unique predictor of risk-taking. Specifically, behavioral intentions were associated with risktaking in the concurrent and longitudinal multivariate models at both the between-person and
within-person levels. Attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control were
associated with-risk-taking indirectly through behavioral intentions at both the between-person
and within-person levels. Additionally, at the within-person level, subjective norms and
perceived behavioral control contributed to risk-taking directly, although the contribution of
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these variables to risk-taking was smaller when behavioral intentions was included in versus
excluded from the model. Because behavioral intentions accounted for the effects of attitudes on
risk-taking and partly accounted for the effects of subjective norms and perceived behavioral
control on risk-taking, prevention/intervention efforts should emphasize reducing behavioral
intentions in order to reduce risk-taking. However, the direct effects of subjective norms and
perceived behavioral control on risk-taking even when behavioral intentions were included in the
model suggest that reducing favorable subjective norms and reducing perceived behavioral
control should also be a focus of treatment.
Reactive decision-making processes, from the Prototype Willingness model (Gerrard et
al., 2008), were associated with concurrent but not longitudinal risk-taking. That is, willingness
was uniquely associated with concurrent but not longitudinal risk-taking in multivariate models.
Similarly, prototype perceptions contributed indirectly to concurrent but not longitudinal risktaking through willingness at the between-person and within-person levels. When considering
concurrent risk-taking, dual process models which include the Prototype Willingness model’s
components offer additional value compared to considering the reasoned decision-making
process alone.
While the current study supports the use of dual process models to explain concurrent
risk-taking, the reasoned decision-making process was associated with risk-taking more
consistently than was the reactive decision-making process. In other words, the reasoned
decision-making process was associated with both concurrent and longitudinal risk-taking
whereas the reactive decision-making process was associated with concurrent risk-taking only.
Much literature argues that the reasoned decision-making process does not solely adequately
explain risk-taking (Albert & Steinberg, 2011; Churchill, Jessop & Sparks, 2008; Pomery et al.,
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2009). The present study’s results are consistent with this assertion in that the reactive decisionmaking process, and the Prototype Willingness model’s components, added additional value to
the reasoned process in terms of explaining concurrent risk-taking. In prior research, willingness
has been evidenced to predict longitudinal risk-taking (Andrews et al., 2008; Thornton et al.,
2002). For instance, prototype perceptions predicted willingness, which in turn predicted
engagement in unprotected sex 6 months later among late adolescents ages 18 to 24 (Thornton et
al., 2002). Also, prototype perceptions in the elementary years (2nd through 5th grade) were
related to substance use in adolescence through willingness (Andrews et al., 2008).
Unfortunately, the present study is not consistent with this prior research because willingness
was not predictive of longitudinal risk-taking.
There are several potential explanations for the finding that behavioral intentions more
consistently predicted risk-taking than did willingness. First, the late adolescent stage of the
present study’s participants may explain the more consistent predictive effect of behavioral
intentions than willingness on risk-taking. Prior research has indicated that the predictive power
of behavioral intentions surpasses that of willingness as adolescents approach adulthood (Pomery
et al., 2009). In Pomery et al.’s (2009) study, willingness was the only significant predictor of
risk-taking in early adolescence (age 13), but behavioral intentions was the only significant
predictor of risk-taking in middle adolescence (age 16). Additionally, behavioral intentions was a
better predictor for students more experienced with engaging in risk-taking whereas willingness
was the superior predictor of risk-taking for students less experienced in risk-taking (Pomery et
al., 2009). Based on these results, it seems that as adolescents age and gain experience, they
begin to better understand their behavioral tendencies, allowing them to more accurately predict
their decisions and behavior (Albert & Steinberg, 2011; Pomery et al., 2009). A second potential
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explanation is that behavioral intentions and willingness have been suggested to indicate
different time frames (Andrews et al., 2008; Gibbons et al., 2003), which may explain the
association of behavioral intentions with longitudinal risk-taking and the association of
willingness with concurrent risk-taking. Willingness suggests a concurrent time frame – i.e., “I
would be willing to smoke a cigarette if someone offered me one right now” – whereas
behavioral intentions suggest a longitudinal time frame – i.e., “I plan to drive recklessly when I
am on my way home today” (Andrews et al., 2008; Gibbons et al., 2003).
Consistent with the evidence supporting the utility of dual process models to explain
concurrent risk-taking, variables from the reasoned and reactive decision-making pathways were
associated with risk-taking indirectly through both the reasoned pathway, behavioral intentions,
and the reactive pathway, willingness. Variables from the reasoned pathway – attitudes,
subjective norms and perceived behavioral control – seem to not simply reflect a solely reasoned,
well-thought out, cognitive process, but to also reflect an affect-laden, emotionally charged,
intuitive reactive processes. Similarly, prototype perceptions seem to involve both reactive
processing as well as reasoned processing. Longitudinally, most variables (except perceived
behavioral control, prototype perceptions, self-control and impulsivity at the between-person
level) were associated with risk-taking only through the reasoned, well-thought out process,
behavioral intentions. These results suggest that the reasoned and reactive decision-making
processes are not distinct and instead influence risk-taking through similar pathways. Some prior
research is consistent with this conclusion. For instance, in Andrews et al.’s (2008) study,
components from the Theory of Planned Behavior (i.e., subjective norms) were found to lead to
subsequent alcohol and cigarette use through both the reasoned pathway, behavioral intentions,
and through the reactive pathway, willingness.
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Integrating Trait and Decision-Making Models
The present study integrated trait and decision-making models of risk-taking to explain
risk-taking behavior. The main difference between decision-making and trait models is that, from
a decision-making perspective, it is necessary to assess specific processes related to the different
forms of risk-taking of interest (e.g., attitudes towards substance use, or subjective norms
regarding reckless driving; Wiers et al., 2010). In contrast, trait models emphasize general or
global time-stable individual differences between people (e.g., fast reactions across situations
and to various stimuli; Wiers et al., 2010).
In the present study, several moderation effects were hypothesized. The association
between impulsivity and risk-taking behavior was expected to be weaker at higher than lower
levels of self-control. However, this effect was not found. The lack of support for this hypothesis
is inconsistent with prior research in which the effect of impulsivity on substance use and other
problem behaviors was less for people with higher than lower levels of self-control (Chen &
Vazsonyi, 2011; Wills et al., 2011). These discrepant findings may be due to differences in
measurement. In both studies, the operationalizations of self-control and impulsivity were much
broader than the operationalizations employed in the current study. In Will et al.’s (2011) study,
the self-control measure assessed planfulness, future time perspective, rational problem-solving
tendencies and delay of gratification. The measure of impulsivity in Will et al.’s (2011) study
tapped distractibility, impulsiveness, and immediate gratification. In Chen and Vazsonyi’s
(2011) study, self-control was indexed by items measuring future orientation relevant to
education, marriage and life. Impulsivity was indexed by items measuring problem-solving
styles. The present study’s conceptualization of self-control and impulsivity was narrow and did
not blend the constructs. In the present study, the self-control scale measured the ability to
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override or alter internal responses and to interrupt inappropriate behavior such as resisting
acting on impulse (Tangney et al., 2004). The impulsivity measure employed in the current study
indexed acting on the spur of the moment and fast reactions (Patton et al., 1995). The different
approaches to measuring self-control and impulsivity in the present study versus prior studies
(Chen & Vazsonyi, 2011; Wills et al., 2011) may account for discrepant findings. Future
research should include more distinct measures of self-control and impulsivity to increase
understanding about the lack of effects found in the present study.
The association between behavioral intentions and risk-taking behavior was expected to
be stronger at higher than lower levels of self-control. This hypothesis was also not supported.
The lack of the hypothesized effect is inconsistent with the one prior study that tested this
association. In this prior study, explicit arousal to alcohol, similar to the reasoned decisionmaking process, predicted alcohol use and problems among individuals with high but not low
working memory capacity (working memory capacity was used to index self-control; Thush et
al., 2008). Again, it is possible that the discrepant findings between this study and prior research
could be due to differences in measurement. That is, the present study utilized self-report and
laboratory-based measures of self-control whereas Thush et al. (2008) utilized a measure of
working memory capacity to index self-control. Additionally, the present study relied upon selfreport measures of behavioral intentions, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral
control to index the reasoned decision-making pathway. In contrast, Thush et al. (2008)
employed an expectancy questionnaire to assess alcohol-related cognitions. The expectancy
questionnaire included items such as “drinking alcohol makes me feel good,” which tap
expectations rather than the components from the Theory of Planned Behavior which reflect the
reasoned decision-making process in the present study.
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The association between willingness and risk-taking behavior was expected to be
stronger at higher than lower levels of self-control. This moderation hypothesis was not
supported. Prior research did not test how impulsivity aligns with the reactive decision-making
pathway, but prior research used working memory capacity as an index of low self-control,
which is considered by some to be synonymous with high impulsivity (Maloney, Grawitch &
Barber, 2012; Wills, Walker, Mendoza & Ainette, 2006). The present study’s failure to find that
impulsivity moderates the effect of willingness on risk-taking is not consistent with the literature
using working memory capacity to index self-control (or the inverse of impulsivity). In prior
research, implicit associations indicative of the reactive decision-making process and similar to
prototype perceptions, predicted substance use among individuals with low levels of working
memory capacity (i.e., low self-control/high impulsivity) but not or not as strongly among
individuals with high working memory capacity (i.e., high self-control/low impulsivity; Friese &
Hoffmann, 2009; Grenard et al., 2008; Houben & Wiers, 2009; Thush et al., 2008). Again, the
discrepant findings between this and prior research may be due to differences in measurement of
impulsivity and the reactive decision-making process. Impulsivity was not directly assessed in
prior research as it was in the present research. In addition, prior research did not measure the
constructs from the prototype-willingness model (i.e., willingness and prototype perceptions) as
did the present study. Instead, implicit association tasks were utilized to index components
similar to the reactive decision-making process. As an example of an implicit association task, in
one study, participants sorted pictures of alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks together with words
related to positive arousal (e.g., “excitement”) and neutral feelings (Thush et al., 2008). The
extent to which participants were faster to sort alcoholic drinks with positively valenced words
than to sort non-alcoholic drinks with positively valenced words generated the index for the
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relative strength of positive affect associations with alcohol (Thush et al., 2008), which could be
considered similar to but distinct from prototype perceptions and the reactive decision-making
model in the present study. Thus, the studies’ methods for measuring the reactive decisionmaking processes seem quite different and impulsivity was not assessed in prior research testing
this association. These methodological differences may account for the discrepant findings. In
sum, the present study measured self-control and impulsivity as distinct, relatively narrow
constructs and assessed the reasoned and reactive decision-making processes via self-reported
assessment of the constructs in the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Prototype-Willingness
model, respectively. The present study failed to find any of the hypothesized moderation effects,
and discrepant findings between this and prior research may be due to methodological
differences between studies.
Although moderation hypotheses were not supported, two significant indirect effect paths
were found consistent with expectations. First, a significant indirect path was found from
impulsivity to risk-taking behavior through willingness (in the concurrent model using selfreported impulsivity data). The indirect effect of impulsivity to risk-taking through willingness
suggests that for individuals high in impulsivity, willingness is integral in affecting risk-taking
behavior. In the present study, impulsivity reflected acting on the spur of the moment and
employing fast reactions. Individuals high in impulsivity may be likely to employ an affective,
intuitive rather quick decision-making process (i.e., the reactive decision-making process) when
choosing whether to engage in risk-taking behavior. Further research is needed to understand the
implications of this effect, but it implies that an intervention approach for individuals
demonstrating high levels of impulsivity should target components from the Prototype-
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Willingness model (i.e., reduce prototype perceptions and willingness) to reduce risk-taking
behavior.
The second indirect effect that was found consistent with hypotheses was that of selfcontrol to risk-taking behavior through behavioral intentions (in the concurrent model using selfreported self-control data). Individuals high in self-control seem to utilize a reasoned decisionmaking process ending in behavioral intentions when deciding whether to engage in risk-taking.
In the present study, self-control was conceptualized and operationalized as the ability to
override or alter internal responses and to interrupt inappropriate behavior including resisting
acting on impulse. Using this conceptualization, self-control seems to be aligned with the
reasoned decision-making process, which involves explicit consideration and well-thought out
weighing of the pros and cons of engaging in risk-taking. Again, more research is needed
investigating this association, but implications are that interventions for individuals with high
levels of self-control should target components from the Theory of Planned Behavior and reduce
individuals’ behavioral intentions to reduce risk-taking.
Although not expected, there was a significant indirect path from impulsivity to risktaking behavior through behavioral intentions (concurrently, using self-report and lab-based selfcontrol and impulsivity data). In addition to employing a reactive process when contemplating
risk-taking, individuals with impulsivity also seem likely to employ a reasoned decision-making
process. Impulsivity was linked to higher levels of risk-taking because of higher levels of
behavioral intentions whereas self-control was linked to lower levels of risk-taking because of
lower levels of behavioral intentions. For impulsive individuals, the perceived benefits of
engaging in risk-taking may outweigh the negative consequences, leading to more behavioral
intentions. For individuals with high self-control, the negative consequences seem more salient
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than the positive benefits, leading to reduced behavioral intentions. More research on this effect
would enhance understanding about the reasoned decision-making process for highly impulsive
versus highly self-controlled individuals. At this point, results suggest that intervention strategies
that target the reasoned decision-making process should differ for individuals high in self-control
versus high in impulsivity.
There is one more effect that was not hypothesized but is worth mentioning. Specifically,
self-control and impulsivity exhibited significant effects on concurrent risk-taking in univariate
models using self-reported self-control and impulsivity data (this effect was also significant for
impulsivity using lab-based impulsivity data) but the effects were no longer significant when
decision-making processes were considered in the multivariate analysis. Adolescents’
engagement in risk-taking may be more strongly influenced by decision-making processes than
by trait self-control and impulsivity. Prior research using a broad measure of self-control
reported that low self-control uniquely explained variation in risk-taking including delinquency
and substance in a multivariate analysis (Wood, Pfefferbaum, & Arneklev, 1993). Prior research
using a measure of sensation seeking reported that high sensation seeking uniquely explained
variation in substance abuse and other risk-taking behaviors in a multivariate analysis (Wagner,
2001). However, no research was found testing the effects of self-control and impulsivity along
with decision-making processes in multivariate analyses as was done in the present study.
Future research should test the effects of self-control, impulsivity and decision-making process
on risk-taking in a multivariate model to follow-up on results from this study.
Strengths and Limitations
A methodological strength of the current study is the multilevel design, which allowed
estimation of between-person and within-person variation in risk-taking behavior. Analyzing
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between-person and within-person differences offers a more comprehensive picture of the
predictors of risk-taking and improves upon the majority of research which is dominated by a
between-person orientation. A second strength of the current study is that it was longitudinal and
controlled for prior risk-taking behavior. Controlling for prior risk-taking behavior is beneficial
because risk-taking behavior may be quite stable. Controlling for earlier risk-taking behavior
provides a test of whether decision-making processes explain change in risk-taking behavior
from the previous three months. A third strength of the study is that it utilized both self-report
and laboratory-based measures of self-control and impulsivity. This allowed the current study to
test whether results generalize across self-report and laboratory-based measures of self-control
and impulsivity. A fourth strength of the study is that it measured impulsivity separately from
self-control rather than blending the constructs or considering impulsivity to be the inverse of
self-control. Distinct measurement of impulsivity and self-control is indicated because the two
constructs have been found to be conceptually distinct (Maloney et al., 2012), differentially
related to behavioral outcomes (Eisenberg et al., 2001), and to be differentiated in factor analyses
(Smith et al., 2007; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).
This study had two major limitations. First, the laboratory-based measures of self-control
and impulsivity did not predict risk-taking behavior (with the exception of an interaction
between self-control and impulsivity which predicted risk-taking behavior in a direction opposite
of expectations). There are some potential explanations for why the laboratory tasks did not
predict risk-taking. As reviewed in the methods section and shown in Table 1, participants who
completed the laboratory-based measures reported higher levels of self-control than did
participants who did not complete the laboratory tasks. Laboratory measures may not have
predicted risk-taking because participants who completed the laboratory tasks exhibited high
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levels of self-control. Another explanation for why the laboratory tasks did not predict risktaking is that the risk-taking behavior outcome measure in this study was based on participants’
self-report. Self-report data and laboratory task measures of self-control (as assessed by the stopsignal task) and impulsivity (as assessed by the delay discounting task) have been evidenced to
not be correlated (Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006). In a meta-analysis, the
correlation between self-reported and laboratory-based impulsivity measures was .0097 (Cyders
& Coskunpinar, 2011). Researchers suggested that self-report and laboratory-based measures tap
different constructs and advised future researchers to use different labels for self-report and
laboratory-based measures of impulsivity (Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011). Also, there was a large
number of participants whose laboratory-based self-control data (i.e., the stop-signal reactiontime data) was dropped from analyses because it violated the assumption of the horse-race
model. A second major limitation is that participation patterns were not consistent across the
three waves of data collection. That is, only 57.4% of the sample completed the laboratory tasks
and only 67.9% of the sample provided longitudinal data. The incomplete participation across
waves reduced the statistical power of longitudinal analyses. Also, to the extent that attrition was
selective, this may have led to biased outcomes. For instance, participants who completed the
laboratory-based measures reported higher levels of self-control than did participants who did
not complete the laboratory tasks so this may have biased outcomes.
This study also had several other limitations. For example, the first other limitation
regards the sample selected. College students are not representative of all late adolescents, and
this limits generalization of results (Tanner, 2006). Although the demographic composition of
the sample was consistent with that of the university from which it was drawn, results may not
generalize to other populations of students. Also, some of the items that were selected as

84

measures – i.e., two criminal behavior items and one risky sexual behavior item – were not
frequently endorsed and were dropped from all measures and analyses. Therefore, this study
does not provide as thorough information about criminal behavior or risky sexual behavior as
intended. Additionally, although this study was longitudinal, the time-period assessed was
relatively short – i.e., 3 months prior. A stronger research design would have tested prospective,
longitudinal associations over a longer period (i.e., 1 year). Another limitation is that it was not
possible to assess predictors of initiation of risk-taking behavior to ascertain whether predictors
of continuance versus initiation of risk-taking behavior differ. This would have been a valuable
research question to address, but initiation of risk-taking behavior was not assessed because the
risk-taking behavior outcome measure only assessed risk-taking engaged in over the past three
months, rather than over the lifespan. Few participants reported initiation from time 1 to time 2
(i.e., did not endorse risk-taking at time 1, but endorsed risk-taking at time 2) in the present study
and this research question was not able to be addressed. The final limitation is in regard to the
age range of participants. Participants varied in age from 18 – 52, and this age range is not
exclusive to the late adolescent population of interest. However, analyses were conducted
controlling for age and results were not substantively different.
Conclusion
In conclusion, and despite these limitations, this study provides evidence supporting the
use of dual process models for explaining concurrent risk-taking, both averaged across forms and
looking at each specific form. The reasoned decision-making process was more predictive of
risk-taking behavior than the reactive decision-making process, as the reasoned but not reactive
decision-making process significantly explained longitudinal risk-taking. The reasoned and
reactive decision-making processes appear to operate through similar pathways, as evidenced by
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the components of the Theory of Planned Behavior exhibiting significant indirect effects through
the reactive pathway, willingness, and the components of the Prototype Willingness model
exhibiting significant indirect effects through the reasoned pathway, behavioral intentions.
Impulsivity was linked with higher levels of risk-taking through more willingness and more
behavioral intentions. Self-control was linked with lower levels of risk-taking through less
behavioral intentions. This study demonstrates the importance of altering decision-making
processes to reduce risk-taking behavior, as well as considering decision-making processes
averaged across forms of risk-taking and by each form of risk-taking.
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Appendix B
Please fill out the survey by marking the appropriate bubble or by writing in your answer. You
to completely fill in the bubble, but try to keep your marks from touching other bubbles.
Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who smoke cigarettes. We are
not thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of people your age
who smoke cigarettes.
How popular are people who smoke cigarettes?
How careless are people who smoke cigarettes?
How smart are people who smoke cigarettes?
How cool are people who smoke cigarettes?
How attractive are people who smoke cigarettes?
How boring are people who smoke cigarettes?

Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who drive over the speed
limit. We are not thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of
people your age who drive over the speed limit.
How careless are people who drive over the speed limit?
How popular are people who drive over the speed limit?
How boring are people who drive over the speed limit?
How cool are people who drive over the speed limit?
How attractive are people who drive over the speed limit?
How smart are people who drive over the speed limit?

Very good

A little
good
Not good
or bad

A little
bad
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Very bad

How bad or good do you consider each of the following:

Doing something illegal
Getting drunk
Having sex with someone you do not know well
Driving a car after drinking alcohol
Vandalizing property
Driving over the speed limit
Having sex outside of a committed relationship
Using illegal drugs
Texting on a cell phone while you are driving
Smoking cigarettes
Stealing something
Having sex without a condom

Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who do illegal things. We are
not thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of people your age
who do illegal things.
How smart are people who do illegal things?
How cool are people who do illegal things?
How popular are people who do illegal things?
How careless are people who do illegal things?
How boring are people who do illegal things?
How attractive are people who do illegal things?

Very

Somewhat

A little bit
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Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who get drunk. We are not
thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of people your age
who get drunk.

Very good

A little
good
Not good
or bad

A little
bad

Very bad

How bad or good do you consider each of the following:

How popular are people who get drunk?
How smart are people who get drunk?
How cool are people who get drunk?
How careless are people who get drunk?
How boring are people who get drunk?
How attractive are people who get drunk?

Strongly
approve
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Approve

Neither
approve
nor
Disapprov
disapprove
e
Strongly
disapprove
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you having sex without a condom?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you smoking cigarettes?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you stealing something?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you having sex with someone you do not know well?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you vandalizing property?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you texting on a cell phone while you are driving?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you driving over the speed limit?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you doing something illegal?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you driving a car after drinking alcohol?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you using illegal drugs?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you having sex outside of a committed relationship?
What would be the reactions of the people who are important to you if they
saw you getting drunk?

Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who have sex outside of a
committed relationship. We are not thinking about anyone in particular,
just your image of people your age who have sex outside of a committed
relationship.
How attractive are people who have sex outside of a committed relationship?
How cool are people who have sex outside of a committed relationship?
How smart are people who have sex outside of a committed relationship?
How careless are people who have sex outside of a committed relationship?
How popular are people who have sex outside of a committed relationship?
How boring are people who have sex outside of a committed relationship?

How easy is it to do something illegal?
How easy is it to have sex with someone you do not know well?
How easy is it to have sex without a condom?
How easy is it to steal something?
How easy is it to get drunk?
How easy is it to text on a cell phone while you are driving?
How easy is it to drive a car after drinking alcohol?
How easy is it to vandalize property?
How easy is it to smoke cigarettes?
How easy is it to have sex outside of a committed relationship?
How easy is it to use illegal drugs?

100

Very easy

Mostly
easy
Not
difficult or
easy
Mostly
difficult
Very
difficult

How easy is it to drive over the speed limit?

How careless are people who steal?
How boring are people who steal?
How attractive are people who steal?
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Very

How smart are people who steal?

Somewhat

How cool are people who steal?

A little bit

How popular are people who steal?

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who steal. We are not
thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of people your age who
steal.

Very
likely

Somewhat
likely

A little bit
likely

Not at all
likely
How likely do you think it is that you will drive over the speed limit one or
more times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will get drunk one or more times in the
next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will have sex outside of a committed
relationship one or more times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will smoke cigarettes one or more
times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will vandalize property one or more
times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will have sex without a condom one or
more times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will have sex with someone you do not
know well one or more times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will text on a cell phone while you are
driving one or more times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will steal something one or more times
in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will drive a car after drinking alcohol
one or more times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will do something illegal one or more
times in the next three months?
How likely do you think it is that you will use illegal drugs one or more times
in the next three months?

How cool are people who text on a cell phone while driving?
How carless are people who text on a cell phone while driving?
How boring are people who text on a cell phone while driving?
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Very

How attractive are people who text on a cell phone while driving?

Somewhat

How smart are people who text on a cell phone while driving?

A little bit

How popular are people who text on a cell phone while driving?

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who text on a cell phone
while driving. We are not thinking about anyone in particular, just your
image of people your age who text on a cell phone while driving.

Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who drive a car after
drinking alcohol. We are not thinking about anyone in particular, just
your image of people your age who drive a car after drinking alcohol.
How boring are people who drive a car after drinking alcohol?
How cool are people who drive a car after drinking alcohol?
How attractive are people who drive a car after drinking alcohol?
How smart are people who drive a car after drinking alcohol?
How careless are people drive a car after drinking alcohol?
How popular are people who drive a car after drinking alcohol?

Very
willing
Somewhat
willing
A little bit
willing
Not at all
willing
How willing are you to drive over the speed limit one or more times during the
next three months?
How willing are you to have sex without a condom one or more times during
the next three months?
How willing are you to text on a cell phone while you are driving one or more
times during the next three months?
How willing are you to steal something one or more times during the next
three months?
How willing are you to smoke cigarettes one or more times during the next
three months?
How willing are you to have sex with someone you do not know well one or
more times during the next three months?
How willing are you to drive a car after drinking alcohol one or more times
during the next three months?
How willing are you to get drunk one or more times during the next three
months?
How willing are you to use illegal drugs one or more times during the next
three months?
How willing are you to do something illegal or more times during the next
three months?
How willing are you to have sex outside of a committed relationship one or
more times during the next three months?
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Very
willing
Somewhat
willing
A little bit
willing
Not at all
willing
How willing are you to vandalize property one or more times during the next
three months?
Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who have sex with someone
they do not know well. We are not thinking about anyone in particular, just
your image of people your age who have sex with someone they do not
know well.
How popular are people who have sex with someone they do not know well?
How careless are people who have sex with someone they do not know well?
How smart are people who have sex with someone they do not know well?
How cool are people who have sex with someone they do not know well?
How attractive are people who have sex with someone they do not know
well?
How boring are people who have sex with someone they do not know well?

How popular are people who have sex without a condom?
How smart are people who have sex without a condom?
How careless are people who have sex without a condom?

104

Very

How attractive are people who have sex without a condom?

Somewhat

How boring are people who have sex without a condom?

A little bit

How cool are people who have sex without a condom?

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who have sex without a
condom. We are not thinking about anyone in particular, just your image
of people your age who have sex without a condom.

Almost
Always/Always

Often

Occasionally

Rarely/Never

People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a
test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each
statement and put an X on the appropriate circle on the right side of this
page. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and
honestly.
I do things without thinking.
I make-up my mind quickly.
I am happy-go-lucky.
I act “on impulse.”
I act on the spur of the moment.
I buy things on impulse.
I spend or charge more than I earn.

Very

Somewhat

A little bit

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who use illegal drugs. We
are not thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of people your
age who use illegal drugs.
How boring are people who use illegal drugs?
How careless are people who use illegal drugs?
How attractive are people who use illegal drugs?
How cool are people who use illegal drugs?
How smart are people who use illegal drugs?
How popular are people who use illegal drugs?

Strongly
Agree
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Agree

I have a hard time breaking bad habits.

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

I am lazy.

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

How much do you agree with each statement?

I wish I had more self-discipline.
I have trouble concentrating.
I change my mind fairly often.
Sometimes, I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is
wrong.
I have trouble saying “no.”
I get carried away by my feelings.
I am good at resisting temptation.
I am able to work effectively toward long term-goals.
I am easily discouraged.
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Gotten drunk?
Had sex without a condom?
Texted on a cell phone while you were driving?
Done something illegal?
Smoked cigarettes?
Driven over the speed limit?
Driven a car after drinking alcohol?
Vandalized property?
Used illegal drugs?
Stolen something?
Had sex outside of a committed relationship?
Had sex with someone you do not know well?

How attractive are people who vandalize property?
How cool are people who vandalize property?
How smart are people who vandalize property?
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Very

How popular are people who vandalize property?

Somewhat

How careless are people who vandalize property?

A little bit

How boring are people who vandalize property?

Not at all

Take a moment to think about people your age who vandalize property. We
are not thinking about anyone in particular, just your image of people your
age who vandalize property.

20 + times

11 to 20
times
6 to 10
times
4 to 5 times

2 to 3 times

1 time

0 times

On how many days in the last 3 months have you…

Finally, we need some basic information about you and your family. Please remember that
only researchers will see these questionnaires, and that your responses will be kept
confidential.

1. What is your age? _____________
2. What is your sex?

3. What is the highest level of school your mother completed?
th

th

grade

or 11th grade

degree
th

or 8th grade

th

grade

school

4. Please indicate your own racial background. (Multiple answers are ok.)

5. What is your current relationship status?

6. Are you taking medications to treat anxiety, depression, attention problems (i.e.,
ADHD) or any other mental problems?
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Please list:
________________________________________________________________________
____
7. Do you have children?

Thank you for participating in the Risk-taking Behavior Project.
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